Feasible Coalitional Structure Formation And Payoff Distribution In Cooperative Games

The formation and distribution of the coalitional structure is a major problem incooperative games.This paper aimed at the participants who in different status or playersthemselves are composed of relative inseparable unions to propose the empoweredcooperative game;Given a so-called rule to form a feasible coalitional structure:in order toget maximum gain,players spontaneously form a primary coalition (also called thefirst-level coalition) which with the weighted averaged maximum gain,next the remainingand excluded players spontaneously form a secondary coalition which with the weightedaveraged maximum revenue,and so on,until all players completed the coalition;wedetermine the players’ equity index via the profit of each feasible coalitionalstructure,while according to the index to allocate the revenue of the biggest coalitionalstructure. The reasonability of the method shows that the players equity comes from thecompetition among individuals,maximizing the overall revenue reflects the playerscooperation.This article mainly explains the formation of coalitional structure and We put forwarda method, it forms a coalition according to the largest per capita income, finally form acoalitional structure.The equity index in cooperative game of each participant isdetermined by feasible coational structure,while to distribute the gain via the index to theparticipants.We also propose a new method of paoff distribution---Shapley-empoweredvalue method.