Font Size: a A A

Public Opinion Spreading Based On Coordination Game With The Factor Of Non-rational

Posted on:2016-01-29Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M X ShenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2180330467497456Subject:Computer application technology
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Along with the continuous development of science and technology, the aid ofnetwork and the communication and some other ways, the harm of public opinionspreading is growing. Public opinion refers to those who are in the rapid spread ofsocial network information, this information can be a rumor, illegal speech, etc., andcan also be some information with positive energy. Due to the progress of science andtechnology makes the public opinion information can be quickly spread and causes alarge social influence. Because of virtual property of the network makes it difficult totrack public opinion information source, which makes it difficult to control the spreadof the public opinion. Usually the way to control the spread of public opinion is tolimit its spread in the network, but prevent the spread of information in the networkitself has violated the advantages of the network itself, provoke disgust at the sametime, so this paper proposes another method to control the spread of public opinion.This paper proposes that it should control the individual’s cognition for the publicopinion information of the network to achieve the purpose of control the spread of thepublic opinion. In the model of this paper, the public opinion can spread freely in thenetwork, the research focused on the processes of the individual’s cognition for thepublic opinion. As long as the individual in the network have a correct understandingfor the public opinion information, it can reduce the social impact of public opinioninformation.This paper uses the coordination game model which is part of the game theory tosimulate the cognitive process of the individuals in the network. Coordination game isthe game that it meets the expected behavior consistent with the game. Coordinationgame itself describes a process of game participants in the negotiation, which is similarwith the situation that the individual discuss the public opinion information in thenetwork.This article also joined the coordination game model with non-rational factors formodeling interaction between neighbors, and this paper mainly studies that under the action of the herd instinct non-rational factors, individuals in the network for theevolution of the public opinion information cognitive process. The non-rational factoris not the usually said the sensibility, but the game participants to choose their ownstrategy, regardless of income, selection strategy according to other conditions. Thenon-rational factors in the game is proposed in recent years, which make up thelimitations of the game theory itself and the game theory assumes that the participantsare pure rational man, and consider only benefits can achieve in the process of game,and then select strategy. There are a lot of non-rational factors, in this paper, thenon-rational factors is herd instinct, it means the game participants regardless ofincome, but with its neighbor selection strategy, choose the strategy which the mostneighbors select.At the same time, this article has also studied some other factors, such as the riskfactor, the initial preference and their influence on individual cognitive processes. Riskfactor is a kind of encouragement to choose risk strategies, in many cases due to somereasons, such as traditional concept the correct cognition can not be widely acceptedand at this time encouraging the one will choose the correct cognition are needed toachieve the goal that the most individuals’ cognition in the network tend to be correct.It can be considered the risk factor is a kind of method to control the spread of publicopinion. In the real world, because everyone has different living environment andsocial experiences, for the same physical view will be different, the initial preference isused to simulate this kind of situation. Along with the continuous game discussion, theinfluence of initial preference will gradually reduce.Experimental results show that the non-rational factors can not change thestrategy choice preference of the most individuals, but can impact on part of theindividual choice of the strategy, making choose different strategy groups appear in thenetwork, and the two groups can not invade each other. The risk factor and the initialpreference can control the strategy choice efficiently, and they can control the publicopinion spread with a certain role.The public opinion spreading in the complex network research helps in theunderstanding of public opinion information spreading process in the network and thelaw of individuals for the interaction of the information of the public opinion andcognitive, it can also further reveal the real world public opinion spreading law ofsocial network, through these laws can provide a certain basis for social networks onthe policy and provide the corresponding strategies to curb the harm done by the public opinion information.
Keywords/Search Tags:herd instinct, non-rational factor, coordination game, public opinion, complexnetwork
PDF Full Text Request
Related items