Game Theory Based Spectrum Management In Wireless Networks

Due to users’ fast-growing demands, wireless spectrum is becominga more and more scarce resource. For historical reasons, much of theradio spectrum is statically allocated. However, the state of spectrumusage shows that while large chunks of spectrum are left idle at manyplaces, many emerging wireless applications cannot get enough spectrumto provide their services. Considering the spectrum usage status, we mustdesign mechanisms to redistribute the idle spectrum to the users whodesperately need it in order to improve the utilization of the spectrum.Spectrum redistribution is an efficient and powerful way to mitigate thesituation of spectrum shortage. A natural way to implement spectrumredistribution is to use auction, by which the spectrum owner (seller) getsprofit through leasing idle spectrum to the wireless applications (buyers)who need the spectrum. However, the mechanisms designed based ondifferent purpose are different. In this paper, we designed two channelauction mechanisms:“SHIELD: a strategy-proof and highly efficientchannel auction mechanism for multi-radio wireless networks” and“DIARY: a differentially private and approximately revenue maximizingauction mechanism for secondary spectrum market”. In contrast to existing truthful mechanisms for channel redistribution,which achieve strategy-proofness at the price of lowered systemperformance, we propose SHIELD, which not only guaranteesstrategy-proofness in the process of channel redistribution, but alsoachieves high system performance. Intuitively, an auction mechanism isstrategy-proof, if it is the best strategy for each buyer to truthfully reporther valuation of the good as the bid, no matter what the others do, andnobody’s individual rationality is hurt. Two commonly used metrics forevaluating the efficiency of a spectrum auction mechanism are spectrumutilization and buyer satisfaction ratio. Although most of existing channelauction mechanisms achieve strategy-proofness, they provide lowguarantee for the allocation efficiency in terms of spectrum utilizationand buyer satisfaction ratio. Our evaluation results show that SHIELDoutperforms the existing mechanisms, in terms of spectrum utilizationand user satisfaction ratio. Here, channel utilization represents theaverage number of radios allocated to channels, and buyer satisfactionratio shows the percentage of buyers who get at least one channel in theauction. We also do some improvements for SHIELD and name themechanism as Fair-SHIELD. Fair-SHIELD achieves fairness in repeatedauctions.There are a number of auction mechanisms proposed to redistributethe idle channels. Many of the existing works target at maximizing the social welfare, and the mechanisms provide low guarantee of the seller’sinterests. Furthermore, most of the existing social welfare and revenuemaximization mechanisms cannot guarantee the bid privacy. Intuitively,bid privacy means the participants cannot figure out others’ bid exactly.In this paper, we propose DIARY, which is a differentially private andapproximately revenue maximizing auction mechanism for secondaryspectrum market. DIARY not only guarantees bid privacy, but alsoachieves approximate revenue maximization. DIARY supports spectrumreuse and bidding for multiple channels. To our best knowledge, we arethe first to investigate the auction mechanisms which achieve both bidprivacy and approximate revenue maximization. We also do a simple, buteffective improvement to achieve fairness, which ensures a minimumservice guarantee for each user in the winning group (we divide the userswho are not conflict with each other into the same group). The parametervectort (t1, t2,, t)indicates trade-off between revenue and fairness,which can be manipulated by the seller depending on different objectivefunctions.