Cournot-Bertrand Multidimensional Game And Its Expanded Analysis

On the basis of Cournot and Bertrand’s single game, we study the Cournot-Bertrand united game under different game circumstances. First of all, from the perspective of participants’decision-making sequence, we analyzes the correspond-ing equilibrium of static and dynamic Cournot-Bertrand game under incomplete information. Secondly, this paper introduces the random risk factor and selects the optimal strategy from the two targets of profit and risk, realizing the strategic target of maximizing profits and minimizing risks in the decision-making process. Lastly, directed toward social welfare, this paper conducts an analysis of the influence of u-nited game and single game on social welfare. Via the analysis of Cournot-Bertrand game, it reveals that the gross profit of Cournot-Bertrand united game is always greater than the single game’s. In addition, it is proved that only from the two perspectives of profits and risks can an enterprise obtain the most desired outcome in the decision-making process.