Accounting Fraud Of Chinese Listed Companies And Its Controlling Based On Game Theory Analysis

This thesis firstly clarifies the risk genes theory of accounting fraud and game theory, discusses the relation between them and study on accounting fraud and realizes that accounting fraud is a typical fiscal game. Secondly, it defines the stakeholders in accounting fraud of listed companies, analyses their fraud action in detail, researches how their stake motivation and restriction affects their action based on stakeholders theory and game theory. Thirdly, it analyses the games of accounting fraud and controlling accounting fraud of the stakeholders and the accounting fraud of Hongguang Corporation and Diamond Corporation. Based on the analysis, it is concluded that the congruous contract between the managers and the manipulative stockholders, shielding of the CPAs, the banks and the local government, the passive supervision of the government and the defective corporate governing framework set off accounting fraud of listed companies. At last, it introduces six countermeasures which concern law, regulation, institution building and political institution reform.Researching accounting fraud of listed companies based on stakeholders theory and game theory, defining the stakeholders and studying the games of the stakeholders in accounting fraud of listed companies in China are features of the thesis.