An Analysis Of Rent-Seeking In Architecture And Process Of Supervision

The architecture industry is one of the pillar industry properties, and is playing a prominent role in our national economy. However, rent seeking in the architecture industry is very popular in China. It greatly hinders Investment benefit; increase the cost of management and risk of management. Furthermore, rent seeking can decrease the efficiency of society resource. It is textual to choose a research work for, the people of the past made the large quantity. This paper has a characteristic. According to my experience on construction, I analyze all teaches in construction (including layout\ design \bid\ stock\ construct\ supervision\ check and accept). There are many rent seeking in these teaches. I am trying to construct a model by using game theory. I consider rent-seeking people as economy individual. They all want to maximize their benefit. That is their motivations. In addition, aim at confusion in construction. I made analyses by using institution economics and information economics. I bring forward key point in restraining rent seeking. This paper Introduce construction engineering supervision system generally, engineering supervision system has been introduced into China since 1988. Its position in engineering increasingly increase, in the control engineering quantity, building price, time limit for a project. This paper also introduces two type of management mode in engineering supervision. On the other hand, this paper analyzes the process of supervision, also give a concrete example (Yangtze gorges engineering), and hope to enlighten management of supervision.