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The Study Of Principal-agency In State-owned Media Enterprises

Posted on:2009-01-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J Z QiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2178360272491545Subject:World economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As the policy of the reform and opening up deepens step by step in China, Reform of Institution is put on the agenda; Media Enterprises Reform is changed to be the main content of the Reform of Institution because of its uniqueness and is spread up in the whole country. State Ownership Structure, as the single structure of the press office, complicates the relation of Principle-agent in the running of the press, leading to the length of the complicate chain, the weakening of the Incentive-restriction Mechanism, the lacking of the efficient supervision tool, the low operational efficiency and the increasing of the operation risk. In the modern Enterprise Organizational Concept, because of the information asymmetric of each party and the externality of one party, all parties involved have a serial of Principle-agent relations between them. Whether the Organization can realize the maximum efficiency directly relates to the agent behavior, while there are the guarantee significance and orientation significance for the incentive and restriction given by the Principle to the Agent. This paper concentrates on the principal-agent relationships existing in the state-owned Media in China, including the relationships between the government and the Media Enterprises managers, as well as the internal relationships in those Media Enterprises. In the case of state-owned Media Enterprises in China, the Ownership cannot be clearly defined. Multiple layers of principal-agent relationships exist between the ultimate owners and the management, which may easily cause series agency problem . From the perspective view of agents, the author analyzed the impact of the yet-to-defined ownership of the state-owned Media, the moral hazard faced by the government, the redundant chain of principal-agent relationship and the imperfect market mechanism. By applying the generally accepted models of the agency problems in the novel institutional economics, combined with several case studies of oversea Media, the author investigated the limitations in the monopolized ownership by the government, followed by some advice on the corporation reform Of Media Enterprises and the designing of the incentive and regulation scheme in order to provide some idea On the resolution of the current low efficient Media management,...
Keywords/Search Tags:Media Enterprises, "Principal-agency" relation, Incentive constraint mechanism, Agency cost, Supervisor cost
PDF Full Text Request
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