Property Right Protection, Social Mobilit And Conflict

Social conflict is one of the common phenomena in human society. It is unavoidable in the operating process of modern society, causes damage to and waste of resources, and thus has a negative impact on the economic growth. The issue has increasingly attracted the economists' attention, whose understanding of the various conflicts has been enhanced particularly by the wide employment of Game Theory. Yet most studies on social conflicts focus their attention on national conflicts on a macro scale (such as war and international conflicts, etc.) and individual conflicts on a micro scale (like crime and rent issues, etc.), giving little notice to the conflicts between different social classes. In reality, especially in a transformational country, social conflicts tend to feature "community", i.e. the conflicts are caused by a group of inferior class, who voluntarily gather together. In China, where a transformational process is underway, social conflicts are becoming more and more intense with the development of economic and mechanical reform, and among them, the conflicts between different social classes turn out to be a major representation.In view of this, this thesis, centering on the conflicts between different social classes, sets out to study the following issues from an economic perspective. Firstly, what are the roots for conflicts between different social classes? Secondly, how do they develop? Finally, how do we understand and prevent them? The key point that connects these issues is the dual effects of property right protection and social mobility. This thesis puts forward that both property right protection and social mobility have an influential impact on social conflicts. Therefore, from the point of view of property right protection and social mobility, it intends to reveal the roots and developmental process of conflicts between different social classes by means of theoretical analysis and the application of Game Theory.Our reasoning is as follows. Firstly, we are going to analyze the roots of conflicts. It is advocated that power capital can lead to competition for interests and formation of social classes, as a result the society is divided into two main strata: the power elite and the public. Secondly, the development of conflicts is explored. The picture in which the elite and the public compete based on the maximum interests principle is depicted through a two-phase dynamic game analysis. In the first phase, the power elite dominate the rate of social mobility. In the second phase, the power elite and the public determine their respective proportion during a conflict.The thesis consists of four chapters.Chapter one summarizes the economic principles related to conflicts, and presents the literature done by previous scholars on the relationship between property right protection and social conflicts, between social mobility and social conflicts. Then the significance and research methodology of the thesis are articulated and its reasoning and framework are introduced.Chapter two digs into the roots of social conflicts from the perspective of power capital. Through theoretical analysis, the damage to property right protection and the encumbrance to social mobility caused by power capital are disclosed. Taking property right protection as a product market and social mobility, a status market, it is pointed out that power capital will generate a huge amount of contestable interests. The economy would remain stagnate if the government is unable to stop power capitalization, and the entire society would run into a chaos of "conflicts".Chapter three, based on Contest Success Function, pictures the process and results of the interaction between the power elite and the public through a two-phase dynamic game model. The power elite cannot increase its profits by solely reducing social mobility. In some cases, measures to boost social mobility can elevate the interests of both strata.Chapter four, based on the previous two chapters, researches into the mutual complementarities between the property right protection and social mobility and brings forward some suggestions on policy to improve the condition of social conflicts in transformational countries.This thesis takes social mobility and property right protection as the main causes for conflicts between different social classes, brings social mobility under the theoretical framework of conflicts economics and treats power capital as the major source for social conflicts. On the other hand, it is advocated that the impacts of property right protection and social mobility on social conflicts are complementary. When one of them deteriorates and the other gets improved, social conflicts would not undergo obvious increase. In other words, if being robbed is unfair, and everyone could have an "equal" opportunity to plunder others, then the whole society would be at least seemingly fair. However, in reality, both tend to develop in the same direction and the deterioration of one would lead to the deterioration of the other. It is one's willful thinking to expect that the improvement of one of them would cut down social conflicts. The elimination of social conflicts and the build of a harmonious society can be truly achieved by the co-efforts of both factors. The government and the power elite should prevent power capitalization though restricting their own power, so as to enhance the products of the entire society and yields more win-win fruits.