A Study On The Expropriation Behavior Of Controlling Shareholders Of China's Listed Companies

The principal-agent relation between managements and shareholders used to be the focus of the study on corporate governance in those companies whose ownership were dispersive.However,the results of some newly research show that most listed companies' ownership structures are relatively concentrative in many countries over the world,which results in interest conflict between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholder.Because the controlling shareholders are able to take use of their control rights to harm the interests of listed companies and the minority shareholders by tunneling,which become a common phenomenon of corporate governance.This paper begins with the different corporate governance problem between the dispersive and concentrative ownership structure and discussion on the forms of controlling shareholders' expropriation behaviors.Then,we make the cost-benefit analysis of the expropriation behavior,which shows that concentrative ownership structure and private benefit of control are the main reason of expropriation as well as the inadequacy of governance model,and that control premium is the sunk cost of private benefit of control.On that basis,we conduct the multi-variable regression analysis on the factors influencing expropriation degree,and find that with the increase of percentage of share held by the controlling shareholders and the premium of control,the expropriation degree goes up and are both statistically significant.The expropriation degree goes inversely with the percentage of independent director and positively with the board of supervisors,but are statistically insignificant.At last,we introduce some policy suggestions.