Analyzing The Cost And Profit Of The Noisy Disclosure Of Information Of Listed Companies Based On The Game Theory

China stock market has developed for more than 10 years. Being a new market, however, there are kinds of problems in its development, such as the market systems and related laws and regulations are still in the processes of building and bettering, which is specially serious in the aspect of noisy disclosure of information of listed companies. The events of false information revelation appeared time and again in the recent years. How to overcome this problem radically is an important issue with practical and theoretical value to both government and financial departments. This article analyses the cost and profit of the noisy disclosure of information through the game theory, including institutional economics and behavioral finance. Furthermore, this article discusses the countermeasures to prevent false information and to enhance the regulation efficiency.The first chapter of this article summarizes related literature and discusses the reasons to analyze the issue of noisy disclosure of information with the game theory. In the second chapter, the players and the basic game relations in the event of false information revelation are introduced. A game model is provided in the third chapter to analyze the cost and profit of noisy disclosure of information, which is empirically evidenced by an actual case. Chapter four inquires into the internal mechanism of the noisy disclosure of information from the corner of institutional economics and behavioral finance. On the ground of the above research and the international comparison between domestic and foreign institutions of information report and stock regulation, the last chapter poses some ideas to prevent fraudulent report and enhance the regulation efficiency.