Economic Analysis Of Trade-secret Protection In Trade Relationship

The economic analysis of trade-secret protection has traditionally focused on the interests of companies to conceal information from competitors in order to gain a competitive advantage through trade-secret law. This has neglected cases in which the interest is not in concealing information from competitors, but from trading partners.We investigate trade-secret protection in such cases. Frequently, asymmetric information will lead to inefficient trade; at the same time, protecting private information might create incentives for socially desirable investments. We model this trade-off in a simple buyer-seller model and find that the optimal fine for violations of trade secrets is positive. In general, however, the welfare effects of increasing a fine are ambiguous.We discuss conditioning the legal protection on a minimum investment by the informed party to conceal the information, and argue that this helps applying trade-secret protection only when it increases welfare. This rationalizes important features of current legal practice.