The Demonstrating Research About The Chinese State-owned Listed Enterprises Which Implement Management Buy-out

Taking the modern enterprise theory as the frame, this paper illuminates and analyzes the problems which the state-owned enterprises reform facing, and indicates that〝as the result of the imperfection of the corporation contract, the residue claim and residue control power should distribute to the proprietor, who has the most dominant information and is most difficult to supervise〞, thereby elicits that: theoretically, MBO has certain positive effects in resolving the insider control,stimulus deficiency and other problems; Then, taking the enterprises who implement MBO as the representative samples, the paper compares the financing index before they implement MBO with the corresponding index after they implement MBO,by selecting the senior managers' share-holding proportion,cash flow ,profit margin ,capital-debt ratio and other financing index after the corporation implements MBO as research variables, forming the regression model to examine their correlativity, the paper makes out that: though MBO has certain feasibilities theoretically, the demonstrating analysis shows that, in real practice, it didn't exert its due effects in improving the corporation performances and reducing the agent costs.