| This paper introduces an inside agent as a counter power to the outside agents in the model of advocates. In this multi-agent model, the outside agent(s) and inside agent get their rewards based on relative performance. In equilibrium, the organization has incentive scheme, which can both induce efforts from outside and inside agents and fully extracts the agents' rent. Competition between the outside and inside agents allows the organization to obtain more information. Without the competition between the outside agents, there is equivalence between one and two outside agents. Furthermore, it is shown that the agents' exerting full efforts be dominant strategy and be strict one when some additional item added to wage scheme. When there is possibility that agent would conceal or forge information, it is shown that the advocacy system combining partisanship and nonpartisanship dominates the other system in that it rules out the possibility that agents would conceal or forge information and the possibility that outside agent would collude with the interested party she advocates. |
