Towards The Problem Of The Dissymmetry Of Information Between The Shareholder And The Corporation

With the growing importance of the market, the dissymmetry of information in oursociety has nowadays become the concern of all walks of life. This paper is to study thelegal system of the disclosure of information in the view of the dissymmetry ofinformation between the shareholder and the corporate. This paper holds that it is because of the absence of the standard system andpowerful measures of surveillance in today's market of security business that the markethas the phenomenon of the dissymmetry of information. This article takes thedissymmetry of information as it's studying object, the disclosure and surveillance ofinformation as the focus, analyses the problems existing in China's security market, so asto give some suggestions about how to optimize China's legal system of the disclosure and 1surveillance of information with the help of the foreign advanced ideas. The problem of the dissymmetry of information has caused the unbalance of theinterests of the parties in the market, affected the efficiency of both the rule of equality andfairness and the assignment of the market resources, thus, it has brought us the problem of"Converse Choice" and "Moral Risks". This paper is to emphasize the function of theoptimization of the system of the disclosure of information to settle the problem of thedissymmetry of information, in the way of studying the theory of the dissymmetry ofinformation, the practice of it in the capital market, and the influence of it to the market ofsecurity business. The phenomenon of false disclosure of information in practice all over the globalincluding well-developed American brings us great shock and is worth thinking much of.In our country, the market is teemed with this phenomenon, and the surveillance ofinformation is far from reasonable. The former includes false disclosure of information,delay of disclosure of information, incomplete disclosure of information, randomdisclosure of information, controlling the market of the security business, and dragglingaudit level. The latter is: incomplete framework of the surveillance of information,impractical legal system on surveillance of information that might be connivance of thefalse action of listed corporations. This article analyzes those existing problem, states thatthe fundamental cause of the problem of the dissymmetry of information is the drive forinterests, that the illegal phenomenon of the disclosure of information not only does harmto the interests of the investors, but also the sustained development of our market of thesecurity business, in this senses, it should be attached great importance. 2How to optimize our system of the disclosure of information is the core of this paper.The author holds that to develop our market of the security business sustainedly, weshould give full play to western advanced ideas in this field. However, western securitysystem is by no means perfect, which can be easily seen from the bankruptcy of Enron,World Communication case, and Qwest's false account case, etc. So it is right for China todevelop the security with it's own characteristics. For this purpose, we can strengthen theinside controlling system of the listed corporation, reinforce the outside surveillancesystem of the market of security business, and optimize the legal system related to theproblem of the dissymmetry of information. Last but not least, this thesis appeals the government to learn from the advancedexperiences of developed countries on the basis of our own national conditions, to hold theprinciple of "openness, quality, and fairness", to optimize the legal system of thedisclosure of information, and meanwhile to speed up the use of the law, so that ourcountry will be on the scientific way forward, which is both globalized and standardizedfrom the point of the market.