| As a form of business organization in the reformation of the corporation system of state-owned enterprise, the solely state-owned company plays an important role in building the socialist market economy of our country. But the practice has shown, the solely state-owned company can not succeed in good operation, thus can not assure sufficiently the hedge and increment of state assets. For turning from such unbenefited situation, it is necessary to reexamine the governance structure of our current solely state-owned company and make a further exploration. The first chapter of this article, starting with the concept of the solely state-owned company, first points out that the investment entity of these companies should be necessarily defined as the investment organization authorized by the state, instead of the departments authorized by the state. Then it presents the corporate governance structure and the rules on the governance structure of solely state-owned company in China. The second chapter analyzes the problems of nonindependent governance, insider control and owner absence in the governance structure of solely state-owned company. The third chapter first in view of the former two problems briefly expresses some tentative ideas on perfection of the governance structure of solely state-owned company, hoping that they can make some contribution to the healthy development of solely state-owned companies in our country. On the one hand, the author puts forth to consummate their decentralization of shareholder's right so as to achieve better choice of the relatively independence of corporate governance; on the other hand, in terms of their supervisory board system, suggests law-maker to adopt the model allowing the coexistence of supervisory board both set up internally and accredited externally. Finally, being aimed at the problem of owner absence, it elaborates the establishment reason, model and character of the state-owned assets supervision and management committee in our country. |