Research On The Accounting Information Disclosed By The Listed Companies

Accounting information is one of the factors on which the investors can depend to make decision. In the securities market, accounting information is necessary, which is the bridge between the listed companies and the investors. But now hi our securities market, there is much false accounting information. The false accounting information disturbs China's economy order. Why is there so much false accounting information? How do the listed companies provide it? And now should we resolve the problem? These questions must be to be resolved as soon as possible.The theme of this paper is to study the false accounting information. The paper is divided into 6 chapters.Chapter 1 is an introduction of some important institutional background of my study and the problem to be resolved.Chapter 2 introduces the reason that the listed companies should disclose the accounting information. Accounting information is the basis that the investors depend on to make decisions. Its disclosure is the foundation for the securities market. The author points out that there is too much false accounting information and the information quantity is poor, which leads to bad result.Chapter 3 analyzes the reason mat there is so much false accounting information. Firstly, based on the contract theory information economy inner control theory etc, the falseness have something to do with the absence of the agent, asymmetry information. The inner controlling and the environment influence the accounting information. Lastly, the author explains the motivation with which the listed companies want to provide false information. The section analyzes the falseness in theory. Its aim is to comprehend the phenomenon. And then recognize and refuse the false accounting information.Chapter 4 discusses the way that the listed companies provide false information. It is possible for the listed companies to make the false accounting information in the four stages such as business occurring . accounting recognition accounting measurement and accounting disclosure.Chapter 5 talks about the author's opinion on how to recognize and refuse the false accounting information. It is the emphasis of the paper, and includes two sections: (1) how to recognize the false information. (2) How to refuse it. (1) Optimize the listed company's mechanism. (2) Lessen the motivation of making false information. (3) Optimize the accounting standards. (4) Strengthen the supervision from CPA. (5) Strengthen the supervision from government, (6) reinforce the management to the listed companies.Chapter 6 is the conclusion that we should reject the false accounting information.