On Sellars's Critique Of The Myth Of The Given

The problem of the foundation of knowledge was one of the central concerns of modern epistemology. Various options are proposed for the foundation of knowledge, such as a priori ideas (Rationalism) and sense-data (Empiricism), etc. The search for the foundation of knowledge has been greatly challenged since mid 20^th century by philosophers from different traditions. Among them, Sellar's critique of the Myth of the Given is insightful and influential.This paper will focus on the first-half of Sellars's canonical paper "Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind", where Sellars argues against the Myth of the Given. The Myth of the Given takes many forms. The most familiar one is the theory of sense-data. But the concept of sense-data is ambiguous in its common usage. Ayer thinks that the theory of sense-data is fine in itself, and the difference between his view and the criticism of the theory of sense-data is just a distinction between an ideal sense-data language and an ordinary language. According to Sellars, Ayer's theory of ideal sense-data language is also one version of the Myth of the Given. Furthermore, Ayer's view on the "the discourse of 'look'" is also wrong, which gives rise to his theory of the ideal sense-data language. By analyzing the "the discourse of 'look'", Sellars argues for Conceptual Holism. Then, Sellars examines the theory of genus/species, determinable/determinate, held by British Empiricists like Locke, Berkeley and Hume. He criticizes their view that abstraction is only a process of obtaining complex concepts from simple concepts. Sellars argues that abstraction is also a process of moving from non-concept, non-awareness to concept, awareness. He concludes with his "Psychological Nominalism" by revising Hume's theory of the determinable in explaining human awareness of abstract entities. He also attackes Shlick's view on "Konstatierungen", and thoroughly destroys his idea of the foundation of knowledge. Sellars' "Psychological Nominalism" represents a deathblow to the Foundationalism and Reductionalism of traditional epistemology.