Optimized Design And Simulation Analysis For Backhoe Device Of Backhoe Loader

This thesis tries to do research on rent-seeking phenomenon comprehensively and deeply, in order to construct the framework of rent-seeking theory. From doing so, the author can illustrate some new phenomenon occurred in our economy since the opening-door policy carried out, and provide China's socialism market economy institutional constriction with theoretical guidance. Therefore, this thesis's logical structure consists of two parts: theory research and application research. In the first part, I put forward a primary framework of political economy analysis on rent-seeking. In the second part, I give the exploration of rent-seeking problem occurred during China's economy transition period. So, the first part is about the general theory of rent-seeking. I normalize and direct to following chapters' analysis by discussing the methodology. This thesis combines positive analysis with normative analysis, and induction with deduction. The positive analysis bases on cost-benefit analysis and the method of institution analysis. I introduce the thought of game theory into the research of rent-seeking. After emphasizing the dependence of economics theory to its prerequisites, I give several prerequisites at the beginning of rent-seeking research. All of my theoretical analysis bases on those prerequisites, especially the "new economic man" one. It is the most important and basic prerequisite in my thesis. Combining the ideology with the economic man's maximizing, I resolve the contradiction between North's ideology theory and the neoclassical economics' maximizing prerequisite. For in Mr. North's opinion, when ideology does work, the behavior of economic man is no longer rational, which means maximizing is no longer being pursued. I define the utility function of economic man as his benefit function minus cost function, which is obviously a multi-parameter function. Here, the function of ideology is to change preference system and reservation price first. Then it changes the benefit function and cost function. Thus, the utility function is changed. The behavior of economic man is the consequence of his cost-benefit calculation. All in word, there is no difference among men's basic motivation of behavior, which all aim at maximizing. The difference of men's behavior only lies in the variation of the result that benefit minus cost among different people. This variation results from the influence of ideology. Following that, I retrospect rent thought history. I draw the concept of rent and modern rent theory, by discussing the formation and evolution of rent concept. Then I explore the arising and extinguishing law of rent that is fundament to rent analysis. Here, I define the result that productive factors' interest minus their opportunity cost as profit or rent. The former results from entrepreneurial innovation, the latter results from government intervention. From doing so, I can divide the interest-seeking behavior of economic man into two kinds: the beneficial profit-seeking behavior and harmful rent-seeking one. The former is productive action and the latter is nonproductive. The motivation of these two behaviors is the same, but the different behavior result from different institution environment. In other words, it is institution environmental changing that lead to economic man's interest-seeking behavior changing, not themselves moral changing. After defining rent and rent-seeking, I analyze the reason, external manifestations, inherent law, resulted consequence and control principle of rent-seeking systematically. First, I give reasons to institution environmental changing, from "market failure" to "government failure", and put forward "adjusting failure". Then, I point out that the sources of rent are: government's unwitting rent-creating, passive rent-creating and active rent-creating. I also describe manifestations of rent-seeking activities at three levels. After that, I analyze rent-seeking activities with cost-benefit method and define the economical limit of rent-seeking, then I provide basis for controlling it. At last, after illustrating the harm of rent-seeking activities, I point out the essential principle of controlling rent-seeking. That is, let economic man will not seek, need not seek, dare not seek and can not seek. In order to rich the primary fundamental framework of rent-seeking theory, I give full description and its application to rent-seeking theory from eight respects. They are public choice theory, theory of international trade, governmental economics, new institutional economics, modern property right theory, new economic history, economics of development and transitional economics. The second part is about the research on rent-seeking in transitional economy. At first, I introduce the background of leading rent-seeking theory into China and China's reform route choice as well as its advantage and disadvantage. Since the gradual transitional way, we carry out "the two kinds of price" policy. Its disadvantage is that large amount of rent is created in our economy and induces rent-seeking activities inevitably. For the first time, I divide the source of rent into three kinds: government unwitting rent-creating, government passive rent-creating and government...