An Equilibrium Analysis Of Mine Disaster

It has seemed common for people to see so many reports and explanations,like"Mine disasters are so pervasive","How much are miners'lives?",as if death and danger are the destiny of the poor. Mine disaster is only an epitome of the contradictions and disharmonies in our fast-developing society. This paper once again chooses it as the theme,but doesn't rest on it only,contrarily,is a preliminary study on the fate of the poor including miners,in order to arouse people's concen and thought about the fate of the poor who suport our fast-growing economy.Mine is just like a "Vanity Fair". Faced with fast-growing economy, overflowing profit and ceaseless mine disasters,all interest subjects-government officials,regulators,investors,miners and family members of the deceased,play their own roles in this game and make their own rational choice based on their own interest. Game leads to an equilibrium,wheras mine disaster is just the appearance of the equilibrium.With the method of case study,this paper explores the essential,inevitable logic and internal conflict behind the case through thorough research into a microeconomic body which highly depends on mine resources ,furthermore finds the conditions suporting the equilibrium,and makes it become a good one by adjusting the relevant variables.This paper includes five chapters.Chapter One is introduction,mainly explaining the reason of the writing,reviewing the current literature and summarizing the perspectives,methods,structure and innovative points as well as shortcomings of this paper.Chapter Two is the case introduction,which on the basis of entire description,focuses its emphasis on the manganese economy that local people depend on and mine safety problem. The Chapter includes three sections,which respectively describe in details how the local officials weigh the advantage and disadvantage among economic growth,social progress and safety production under the given incentive mechanism and institutional background;the history ,current conditions and institutional evolution of the mine enterprises,especially its safety problem;under the given environment,how the mine owners and managers weigh the advantage and disadvantage between safety and production;the survival dilemma and practical choice of the local people.Chapter Three is the core of the paper,which touches the essence of the problem through the appearance,makes clear the internal logic of how the relevant interest subjects interact with one another and relevant exogenous variables,establishes the target fuctions of the officials, mine owners and miners,repectively works out their optimal solutions and finds the equilibrium solution at which three subjects'optimal choices coincide.Chapter Four is also an important chapter, which verifies the nature of the equilibrium through case analysis and empirical test which includes thorough description of authenticity and randomness of the samples, establishment of the models and comments on the results.Chapter Five proposes the strategies of breaking the disadvantageous equilibrium,including changing the economic growth mode,the incentive mechanism of administrative achievements and the government functions,perfecting mine right and labor markets,and enforcing vocational safety regulation,and so on.