Perceptions Of China In The Global Governance Of Climate Change

This paper is a study on how China is perceived worldwide in the global governance of climate change, taking the 2009 UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen as a case study. China's role has been highly debated and how China acted is perceived differently throughout the world. Hence, the research question is:What role did China have in the Copenhagen Conference and how was that role perceived worldwide? The argument is that China has received more criticism than it deserves due to perceptions and misperceptions, rather than reality.This paper consists of five parts, starting with the theoretical background that discusses how and why perceptions matter in international policy making. To what extent perceptions matter is highly debated in international relations theory. The Copenhagen Conference was about more than the climate; it was highly a strategical/political game between the main opponents where perceptions strongly influenced the sequence of event. Therefore this study relies on the Constructivist discourse, where perceptions have significant impact. When states tend to perceive each other, and themselves, far from the reality in a negotiation process, the outcome will not be constructive. Indicating a need to bridge these perceptions gaps in order to reach an ambitious climate treaty.The second part consists of the case study of the Copenhagen Conference, which examines the three main players:China, the US, and the EU, and their roles. Analysed in the domestic context, with reference to earlier responses to climate change, in relation to the Kyoto protocol, the leadership roles in Copenhagen, and the frustration that was seen in Copenhagen. As mentioned, the opinions about China's role and the total outcome of the conference differ widely. By studying official announcements and the media coverage the following differences were found. Domestically, China is perceived to have played a constructive and responsible role in Copenhagen and the total outcome is satisfying. The EU was most disappointed with the outcome and put the blame on both China and the US. The US blamed both themselves as well as China, while "officially they were satisfied with the outcome and the government officials put the blame on China.Third, an abbreviation of how China was perceived from within China, the EU, and the US is offered. These negative perceptions of China from the US are explained by the domestic political reality within the US. For the US to commit to anything they have to win the majority in the Senate, which is a very hard task. This fact left the US negotiators in Copenhagen pretty much powerless, since they knew that at the end of the day it is still the Senate at home that decide. Due to domestic resistance and the lobbyist in Washington, the US negotiators and Obama realised that winning a debate regarding ambitious environmental standards in the Senate would be impossible and as a result Obama had to do something in order to escape criticism. Hence, he put the blame on China who historically has been to blame for acting intransigently. This attempt was more or less successful; China did not accept this role and has been feeling unfairly treated.Fourth, an analysis of these gaps in perceptions is given, discussing the potential risks of entering an agreement, the economic competitiveness, the role of domestic politics, the mistrust among the three players, and historical and ideological impact. Since media highly influences perceptions, and the media have different roles in China versus the US and the EU, media's different roles have been analysed. To commit to an ambitious agreement implies huge risks for all parties and the economic risks are fundamental. The risk for the US to commit in Copenhagen were the highest due to that they do not have the capacity for reducing emissions yet and stricter environmental standards would make the US lose competitive advantages to China and the EU. The EU had the lowest risk, since they have already implemented the high costs for reducing emissions according to the Kyoto Protocol, and developed green technology. For China the risk is that it can harm economic growth, whereas growth is necessary to maintain increases in living standard for the Chinese citizens. In total, there was much more at stake than the environment in Copenhagen.Further, the negative perceptions of China can be explained in terms of history and ideology, cultural and language differences. China's economic growth and increasing importance in the world arena is threatening for the West, partly based on fear of the unknown.The fifth part consists of conclusions, recommendations and suggestion for further research. Some policy recommendations are that more attention should be given to the real issue and less attention to suspicions about others' intentions, that it is time to give bilateral and unilateral agreements more space and credit, rather than solely focus on global treaties. Further, the "failure" in Copenhagen needs to not be concentrated on; instead it is time to look beyond Copenhagen. All parties have to improve their own image and not focus so much on the image of the other and they have to be negotiable and willing to give something up. It is impossible for all parties to get exactly everything that they want.