From "the Cognizable Principle" To "the Principle Of First Person Perspective's Limit"

The issue of normativeness about the scientific method has always been the focus of the debate between naturalists and foundationalists. For the naturalist, they reject any so-called "a priori" normative standards, and the only standardized approach they acknowledge just exists in a specific scientific process of a specific study, which is subject to the constraints of specific research purposes. However, it is hard to say that the specific norms in scientific research are definitely without any abstract basis in the theory of knowledge. After all, what all scientific researches pursue is objective knowledge.The purpose of this paper is to give a normative methodological principle which can be applied to some specific field'in psychology through a case analysis of a psychological research used to clarify a fallacy, and then I attempt to explain that the basis of this principle of psychology methodology just comes from the field of the theory of knowledge.This paper describes a simple and interesting psychological cases, in the case study refutes a popular fallacy that a broad range of psychology-the version of "conversion of the visual inverted image". This argument, processing with thought experiments as the main method, combined with the relevant experimental evidence, refutes all the logical possibilities of "a sense of conversion disorder". After that, the widespread main reasons of the fallacy are summarized as that, observed the third-person facts observed by researchers are simply replaced by the first-person facts, resulting in a "naturalistic fallacy". When processing some proposition with a "double structure"-the third-person statement form and first-person semantic content, it is easy to lead to such a fallacy. In response to this difficulty, "the principle of first person perspective's limit" is proposed to test propositions as a methodological principle:for psychological propositions with a dual structure, its semantic content can not exclude all channels, or the possibility of justification from the first-person perspective awareness of the proposition.The next discussions ensue on the standard analytical model of knowledge in the field of contemporary knowledge-the Justified True Belief model, and briefly reviewed the Gettier's problem and various schools'efforts to solve this issue. Although not obtain the knowledge's sufficient conditions, but JTB model can still be saved as a set of necessary conditions. Derived from the necessary conditions, something can be used to constrain the propositional knowledge-"the cognizable principle":a necessary condition for S knows P, is that the semantics of propositions P cannot rule out principally all possible channels for S to know P. "The principle of first person perspective's limit" can be seen as a specialization of "the cognizable principle" in the field of cognitive psychology. And then based on the "the cognizable principle", a analysis on Putnam's semantic argument against "brain in vat" is given to show this principle's normalizing function, and its mode of function is similar with the function of" The principle of first person perspective's limit".The main purpose of this paper is, on the version of the contemporary theory of knowledge, to give a partial normalization to the cognitive psychology. By the necessary conditions from the standard analysis of knowledge, "the cognizable principle" is proposed. Derived from this, further in more specific areas of cognitive psychology research, the specialized principle of the methodology-"The principle of first person perspective's limit"-can be used to test the particular proposition with a particular dual structure.