| Government regulation is an important means for government to intervene in market behavior to make up for various market failures caused by the market’s own shortcomings.China’s capital market is in a period of rapid development,and government supervision is particularly important for the healthy and orderly development of the capital market.The exchange market is an important part of the capital market,and the listed companies are important subjects of the capital market,which are affected by the government regulation to varying degrees.The greater the intensity of government supervision,the clearer the formulation of regulatory policies,the higher the constraint and deterrence of regulatory objects,the higher the illegal cost and risk of enterprises,and the more restrictions on the behavior of enterprise management.In the supervision of listed companies,as the CSRC takes more and more regulatory measures on listed companies,it has an important impact on listed companies’ stock prices,financial information quality,financing investment,tax avoidance innovation and other aspects.In particular,with the steady advancement and implementation of the "deleveraging" policy,the CSRC has gradually strengthened its supervision of the leverage of listed companies,such as putting forward financial leverage requirements for listed companies issuing corporate bonds,requiring listed companies with a leverage ratio of a certain level to disclose information in a timely manner,and conducting "window guidance" for listed companies with an excessive leverage ratio.All these will have a certain impact on the change of leverage of listed companies.When facing the regulatory pressure of the CSRC,the management of listed companies will either actively or passively adjust corporate leverage to meet the regulatory requirements.Therefore,this thesis takes the supervision of listed companies as a research perspective to explore the influence of the supervision intensity of listed companies on corporate behavior,especially corporate leverage.As public companies,listed companies are more sensitive to changes in regulatory intensity.Specifically,since 2008,China’s macro leverage ratio and micro enterprise leverage ratio have increased rapidly,leaving potential risks for sustainable economic development.Since 2017,the Party Central Committee and The State Council have issued a series of policies to implement "deleveraging",requiring regulators to promote enterprises to reduce leverage and defuse risks.Under the supervision of the CSRC,listed companies have also actively carried out "leverage reduction" actions,and the regulatory authorities attach great importance to the financial leverage of listed companies.Therefore,this thesis raises the following questions: Under normal circumstances,after the regulatory authorities adjust the supervision intensity of listed companies,how to adjust corporate leverage? In particular,what will happen to leverage levels? The speed of capital structure adjustment is closely related to the value of listed companies.After increasing the supervision intensity of listed companies,how will the speed of capital structure adjustment be affected?After the intensification of supervision,higher requirements are put forward for the financial management of enterprises.Will the problem of leverage manipulation be effectively solved?How does the regulatory intensity of listed companies affect the leverage level,capital structure adjustment speed and leverage manipulation? In view of this,this thesis studies the relationship between the regulatory intensity of listed companies and corporate leverage and tries to solve the above problems.First of all,this thesis sorts out the relevant theories of government regulation and corporate leverage,sorts out the basic theories and models related to government regulation and corporate leverage at home and abroad,and finds that few studies combine the intensity of government regulation with corporate leverage(leverage level,leverage adjustment and leverage manipulation),and finds that from the perspective of the supervision of listed companies by the CSRC,The literature on its impact on corporate leverage is even less.Secondly,in order to accurately quantify the regulatory intensity of listed companies,this thesis constructs an indicator system of regulatory intensity of listed companies,constructs a regulatory intensity index and introduces it into a panel data regression model to empirically analyze the relationship between regulatory intensity of listed companies and corporate leverage.Finally,this thesis takes the leverage level,leverage adjustment and leverage control as research perspectives,selects the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to2020 as research samples,and takes the provinces where listed companies are located as the basis.The effects of regulatory intensity on leverage ratio,capital structure adjustment speed and leverage manipulation degree of listed companies were discussed by using measurement methods such as OLS model and fixed effect model.Heterogeneity analysis was carried out from the aspects of corporate characteristics,regional characteristics and time characteristics,and significant empirical results were obtained.Further,this thesis studies and analyzes the mechanism of the influence of the regulatory intensity of listed companies on corporate leverage level,leverage adjustment speed and leverage manipulation from the perspectives of corporate operating conditions,financing constraints,information transparency and opportunism motivation.In the process of empirical analysis,propensity matching score method,instrumental variable method and sample replacement method are fully used to verify the robustness of empirical results.With the support of empirical results,this thesis draws the following conclusions:(1)There is a significant negative correlation between the regulatory intensity of listed companies and the level of corporate leverage,that is,the greater the regulatory intensity of listed companies,the lower the level of corporate leverage.Heterogeneity analysis shows that:First,with the increase of supervision intensity of listed companies,the decrease of leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises is significantly greater than that of private enterprises,and the decrease of leverage ratio of listed companies with high leverage ratio and low return ratio is significantly greater than that of listed companies with low leverage ratio and high return ratio and other general listed companies;Second,as the supervision intensity of listed companies increases,the decrease of leverage ratio of listed companies in regions with high degree of marketization is significantly greater than that in regions with low degree of marketization,and the decrease of leverage ratio of listed companies in regions with low degree of opening up is significantly greater than that in regions with high degree of opening up.Third,with the increase in the supervision intensity of listed companies,the decrease in the leverage ratio of listed companies after 2016 is significantly greater than that of listed companies before 2016.Mechanism analysis shows that: the increase of supervision intensity of listed companies will reduce the level of corporate leverage ratio,and the decrease of leverage ratio of listed companies mainly comes from the improvement of corporate operating conditions,that is,the increase of supervision intensity of listed companies will reduce the leverage ratio by reducing the financing cost of enterprises and improving the ability to pay debts.(2)There is a significant positive correlation between the regulatory intensity of listed companies and the speed of capital structure adjustment,that is,the greater the regulatory intensity of listed companies,the faster the speed of capital structure adjustment.Heterogeneity analysis shows that: First,with the increasing supervision intensity of listed companies,the speed of capital structure adjustment of private enterprises is significantly faster than that of state-owned enterprises,and the speed of capital structure adjustment of small-scale listed companies with low proportion of tangible assets is significantly faster than that of large-scale listed companies with high proportion of tangible assets and other general listed companies;Second,with the increasing supervision intensity of listed companies,the capital structure adjustment speed of listed companies in the economically developed eastern regions is significantly faster than that in the economically underdeveloped central and western regions.Mechanism analysis finds that: the increase of supervision intensity of listed companies will accelerate the speed of capital structure adjustment,and the acceleration of capital structure adjustment speed of listed companies mainly comes from the decrease of financing constraints,that is,the increase of supervision intensity of listed companies will accelerate the speed of capital structure adjustment by reducing the degree of financing constraints of enterprises.(3)There is a significant negative correlation between the regulatory intensity of listed companies and the degree of corporate leverage manipulation,that is,the greater the regulatory intensity of listed companies,the lower the degree of corporate leverage manipulation.Heterogeneity analysis shows that: First,as the supervision intensity of listed companies increases,the degree of inhibition on leverage manipulation of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of private enterprises;Second,as the supervision intensity of listed companies increases,the inhibition effect on the leverage manipulation of listed companies in the economically developed eastern regions will be weaker than that in the economically underdeveloped central and western regions;The third is to strengthen the supervision of listed companies.After 2018,the inhibition of leverage manipulation of listed companies is stronger.Mechanism analysis shows that: the increase of supervision intensity of listed companies will inhibit corporate leverage manipulation,and the decrease of leverage manipulation degree of listed companies is mainly affected by corporate information transparency and management opportunism motivation,that is,the increase of supervision intensity of listed companies will inhibit corporate leverage manipulation by improving corporate information transparency and reducing management opportunism motivation of listed companies.On the basis of the research conclusions,this thesis puts forward the following policy recommendations: First,to strengthen the scientific and adaptive government supervision,timely adjust the intensity of supervision.Second,we need to improve the quality and effectiveness of supervision and guide enterprises to optimize leverage.The third is to improve the operating conditions of enterprises and actively respond to the "deleveraging" policy.The fourth is to reduce the degree of financing constraints,improve the speed of capital structure adjustment of listed companies.Fifth,it is necessary to improve internal decision-making and external supervision,and comprehensively curb the leverage manipulation of listed companies. |
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