| Financing difficulties has always been one of the main factors affecting the development of small and medium-size enterprise(SMEs).In particular,the outbreak of the COVID-19 has further deteriorated the financing environment faced by SMEs.The emergence of supply chain finance and the support of relevant national policies for supply chain finance business have greatly promoted the development of supply chain finance and provided a new way to solve the financing problem of enterprises.As one of the main ways to use the accounts receivable generated in the later stage of supply chain operation for financing,factoring financing has developed rapidly due to its advantages of easy decentralization and sustainability,but there have always been more defaults and fraudulent behavior.In addition,the continuous maturity and application of new technologies such as blockchain,big data,and artificial intelligence,as well as the empowerment of supply chain financing business,have gradually highlighted the problem of income distribution in financing.In addition,more and more downstream supply chain enterprises are facing significant inventory backlog and negotiating with upstream to improve supply chain operation and financing efficiency through buy-back.Buy-back behaviour complicates the value transfer between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain,gradually highlighting the issue of profit distribution in factoring financing.Therefore,studying the factoring financing(standard factoring and reverse factoring)model and its guarantee and profit distribution mechanism for capital-constrained enterprises has gradually become one of the important issues in social economy and supply chain operations.First,in the factoring financing business,this paper takes a two-level supply chain consisting of a retailer and a capital-constrained supplier,in which the retailer sells the supply chain at a certain wholesale price to the supply chain.The retailer buys a single product to sell to a random market and delays payment,resulting in accounts receivable.After suppliers supply to retailers,their own funds are not enough to support their own procurement and production,and then they apply for financing from financial credit institutions such as banks and factors through accounts receivable.With the consideration of four situations of no guarantee,intextnal partial credit guarantee,external partial credit guarantee of third-party guarantee institutions,and repurchase guarantee of supply chain management companies,this paper analyzes the financing model of forward factoring and the guarantee in financing for the transfer of accounts receivable and the impact of government subsidies on financing efficiency and supply chain coordination based on the Stackelberg game model.The study points out that the retailer’s default risk has a greater impact on financing decisions and financing efficiency,and guarantee can effectively reduce the negative impact of the retailer’s default risk.Secondly,in the third-party external partial credit guarantee,the guarantee fee borne by the retailer is better than that of the capital-constrained supplier;in the repurchase guarantee of the supply chain management company,The interest rates offered by financial institutions such as banks or factors are not affected by the retailer’s risk of default,and can reduce the rate at which supply chain management companies can finance constrained suppliers.Finally,with the increase of the partial credit guarantee coefficient,the optimal guarantee mechanism in the factoring financing is the supply chain management company repurchase guarantee,third-party external partial credit guarantee where the retailer undertaking guarantee fee.Secondly,in the context of factoring financing by capital-constrained suppliers through accounts receivable,this study breaks the commonly used assumption that the salvage value of unsold products by retailers at the end of the sales period is zero in previous studies,and considers the buy-back behavior of suppliers on unsold products of downstream retailers.Combining the two-person bargaining game theory,this study analyzes the impact of buy-back and bargaining on the factoring and financing participants’decision-making.The study pointed out that obtaining financing with a high loan-to-value rate from banks requires high financing costs,and appropriately reducing the bargaining power or expected profit ratio of upstream suppliers can effectively weaken the impact of rising loan-to-value rates on financing efficiency.In addition,when not buying back,the supplier always chooses not to bargain,while the retailer chooses to bargain when the supplier’s bargaining power is low;and when buying back,both the supplier and the retailer choose to bargain when the supplier’s bargaining power is low.When not bargaining,the supplier chooses to buy back when the profit ratio is relatively large;when bargaining,the supplier chooses to buy back when the profit ratio is relatively small(low bargaining power).Finally,if the upstream supplier bargains based on the buy-back price when in the context of buy-back,the optimal decision of each participant in the financing is consistent with the non-bargaining,that is,the decision is bargaining-proof.Thirdly,in the context reverse factoring financing business,by taking a two-level supply chain that consisting of a retailer and a capital-constrained supplier,this article focuses on three reverse factoring situations with the consdeiration of credit loss risk:no guarantee,third-party external guarantee and reverse factoring through the platform.Based on the Stackelberg game model,this paper analyzes the optimal options for retailers to carry out reverse factoring financing.The study pointed out that the retailer’s credit loss risk has a significant negative impact on financing efficiency.Secondly,when retailers take the initiative to carry out reverse factoring financing,third-party external guarantees cannot effectively reduce the negative impact of credit loss risk.That is,the external guarantee in reverse factoring financing is inefficiency.In addition,through platform to matching reverse factoring financing can effectively reduce the impact of the risk of credit loss,and the advantage increases as the credit line decreases.When the service rate of the platform is low,retailers should choose to carry out reverse factoring business through the platform.Finally,similar with standard factoring,in the context of reverse factoring with credit loss risk,this study also breaks the commonly used assumption that the salvage value of unsold products by retailers at the end of the sales period is zero in previous studies,and considers the buy-back behavior of suppliers on unsold products of downstream retailers.Combining the two-person bargaining game theory,this study analyzes the impact of buy-back and bargaining on the reverse factoring and financing decision-making.The study pointed out the optimal decisions and profit of each financing participant decrease with the retailer’s credit loss risk.When not buying back,the supplier always chooses not to bargain,while the retailer chooses to bargain when the supplier’s bargaining power is low;when buying back,both the supplier and the retailer are tending to bargain;when not bargaining,the supplier chooses to buy-back when expected profit ratio is relatively large;and when bargaining,suppliers always tend to buy back.In addition,consistent with the situation in standard factoring financing,if the upstream and downstream of the supply chain choose to bargain based on the buy-back price,the optimal decision and optimal profit of each participant in the financing are the same as when they do not bargain.That is,the decision is bargaining-proof.Under the background that accounts receivable has gradually become the main support for supply chain financing,this paper comprehensively and systematically analyzes the supply chain under the two factoring financing strategies:factoring and reverse factoring.The influence of guarantee on factoring decisions and financing efficiency,the optimal guarantee mechanism and the optimal strategy for factoring under different scenarios are given.In addition,based on the two-person bargaining game theory,the profit distribution mechanism under different factoring financing types is given.This paper studies how to maintain the long-term and stable cooperative relationship between the core enterprises,SMEs,financial institutions such as banks and guarantee institution.Furthermore,this study can give some insights on how to promote the healthy flow and distribution of funds,solve the financing problems of SMEs and coordinated the supply chain.This paper has positive theoretical and practical insights for the development of factoring financing which based on accounts receivable. |
