| The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly stated that "it is necessary to strengthen and improve modern financial supervision,strengthen the financial stability guarantee system,bring all types of financial activities into supervision in accordance with the law,and maintain the bottom line of preventing systemic financial risks." As one of the "three pillars" of the financial industry,the insurance industry plays the role of a market stabilizer in the financial system.The insurance industry is highly correlated with other financial industries and has a significant risk transmission effect.The internal risks of the insurance industry are easily transferred and spread to the entire financial system.Therefore,the healthy and stable development of the insurance market will directly affect the security of the entire financial system and even national security.China’s insurance industry started relatively late,and has achieved rapid development since the insurance industry recovered.The size of the insurance market has grown from the only remaining PICC at the beginning of the reform and opening up to the current 237 insurance institutions.Insurance premium income has also increased from the initial 460 million to 4.5 trillion in 2021.Insurance penetration has also increased from 0.1%in 1980 to 4.15%now.However,the rapid development in the past 30 years has caused the insurance market to face many problems:First,the pursuit of short-term benefits brought about by the extensive and rapid development of the industry has made it difficult to effectively maintain long-term benefits.The second is that "clustered competition" leads to frequent violations and chaos in the insurance market.The occurrence of violations will seriously affect the reputation of the insurance industry and increase the operating risks of the insurance industry.In 2020,the State Financial Supervision Bureau issued a total of 1,692 fines against insurance companies and individuals for violations,with a total penalty of up to 180 million yuan.Among them,45 insurance company fines had a single penalty amount of more than 500,000 yuan.In 2021,the State Financial Regulatory Bureau issued more intensive documents,successively issued the "Notice on In-depth Special Work on the Control of Chaos in the Personal Insurance Market","Notice on the Normalization of the Banking and Insurance Industry to Carry Out the Work of Suppressing Crime and Evil" and other notices.Further strengthen the investigation and rectification of violations of laws and regulations in the insurance industry.In 2021,the State Financial Supervision Bureau issued a total of 2,259 fines to the insurance industry,involving a fine of 270 million yuan,and the number of large fines of more than 500,000 yuan increased to 83.In the short term,although the regulatory authorities have paid more and more attention to post-event punishment measures for insurance violations,and relevant insurance laws and regulations have also been improved,insurance violations have been banned repeatedly,and there is a trend of increasing fluctuations.However,the existing research on insurance supervision mainly focuses on the restraint and correction of "pre-event" violations,focusing on the supervision of the solvency of the insurance industry,and has not yet involved the discussion of the post-event punishment effects of insurance violations.Therefore,it is of great significance to improve the efficiency of supervision and promote the healthy development of the insurance industry by combining the realistic background of regulatory penalties and exploring the mechanism and effects of insurance regulatory penalties.The research content of this paper mainly includes the following three aspects:The first is to build a three-party evolutionary game model based on insurance companies,insurance regulatory authorities and insurance consumers,and explore the impact of each parameter on the equilibrium state of the game based on the benefits and changes in strategic choices of each party after the violation occurs.Then the three-party evolutionary game model was expanded,and the influence of branch association factors on the equilibrium state of the game model was analyzed.Finally,the evolutionary game model was simulated and the system evolution trajectory of the three-party strategy selection probability changes was depicted.The second is to explore the impact of regulatory penalties for violations on insurance company risks from a micro perspective.First,based on the above theoretical mechanism analysis,the effect of regulatory penalties on insurance company risks was tested.Subsequently,the transmission path of insurance regulatory penalties to insurance company risks was analyzed from the perspectives of market constraints and business-side efficiency.Furthermore,the deterrent effect and long-term effect of regulatory penalties are analyzed.Finally,it tests whether regulatory penalties can promote the suppression of insurance company risks in the context of "C-ROSS".The third is to explore the impact of regulatory penalties for violations on regional insurance consumption from a macro perspective.First,by assigning values to insurance company branches and using the gravity model to construct the insurance company branch network,the network topology relationship is obtained,and the evolution of my country’s urban network based on the association of insurance company branches is analyzed.Secondly,the correlation formed by the insurance branch network is used as a spatial weight index,and the spatial econometric model is used to analyze the direct impact and spatial spillover effect of insurance regulatory penalties on regional insurance consumption,thereby exploring the impact mechanism of insurance company regulatory penalties on regional insurance consumption,and trying to Analyze the penalty effects on insurance consumption during the development of the regulatory penalty system.Through the above research,the main conclusions are as follows:First,by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of insurance companies,insurance regulatory authorities and insurance consumers,it was found that when insurance companies actively rectify,regulatory authorities strictly review,and consumers actively supervise,the model is more likely to evolve to a stable state.Secondly,through the introduction of insurance branch association elements,it is found that insurance branch association will promote the evolution of the dynamic game system to the equilibrium point(active rectification,strict review,active supervision).Second,by studying the impact of regulatory penalties on insurance company risks,we found that insurance regulatory penalties can effectively curb insurance company risks.Judging from the differences in the main businesses of insurance companies,the risk suppression effect of personal insurance companies is stronger than that of property and casualty insurance companies.The insurance products of property and casualty insurance companies have shorter insurance products,and most consumers will not pay too much attention to the irregularities of insurance companies.After being punished,insurance companies have less incentive to actively rectify,so the risk suppression effect is weak.From the perspective of the ways in which regulatory penalties suppress risks for insurance companies,the business side of insurance companies and market constraints are the main paths through which regulatory penalties play their role.Further analysis of the impact of regulatory penalties on insurance companies’ risks shows that regulatory penalties have a significant inhibitory effect on insurance companies’ mid-term and long-term risks.And as time increases,the risk suppression effect of personal insurance companies increases even more.Judging from the impact of regulatory penalties on non-penalized companies,regulatory penalties still have a certain deterrent effect on the insurance market.When nonviolating companies are located in areas where the amount of insurance regulatory penalties and fines is relatively high,they will standardize their own business behavior and further reduce risks.Finally,the impact of regulatory penalties on insurance company risks in the context of C-ROSS is analyzed.Through empirical research,it is found that the implementation of C-ROSS has significantly improved the inhibitory effect of regulatory penalties on insurance company risks.Third,by studying the impact of regulatory penalties on regional insurance consumption,the article finds:First,from the provincial gravity network constructed based on the association of insurance branches,it can be seen that the intensity of the association network of provincial insurance institutions in my country has increased year by year in the past ten years,showing multi-polar development.situation.Secondly,the spatial autocorrelation of regulatory penalties and insurance consumption is analyzed.The results show that there is significant spatial autocorrelation in both,which is consistent with the construction basis of the spatial econometric model.Finally,based on the results of the model selection test,the spatial Durbin model is used to analyze the effect of insurance regulatory penalties on regional insurance consumption.The results show that whether it is a direct effect,an indirect effect or a total effect,regulatory penalties on insurance companies will increase the level of insurance consumption.The innovations and academic contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in the following three aspects:First,in terms of the analysis of the mechanism of regulatory punishment,a tripartite evolutionary game model of insurance companies,regulatory authorities and insurance consumers is constructed in combination with the actual situation,and the mechanism of regulatory punishment for insurance violations is analyzed.Specifically,the evolutionary game model theoretically realizes the description and analysis of the mechanism of insurance supervision and punishment,and obtains the conditions for maximizing the utility of supervision and punishment by controlling the equilibrium solution of the model.On this basis,it is tested by methods such as empirical regression.To a certain extent,it enriches the theoretical basis of insurance supervision.Second,in terms of analysis of the effects of regulatory penalties,the impact of insurance regulatory penalties on insurance consumption and insurance company risks is analyzed from the macro and micro levels.In the empirical test of regulatory penalties and insurance consumption,the gravity network of insurance branches is innovatively introduced to construct a spatial weight matrix,and the effects of regulatory penalties are measured from two perspectives:direct effect and spatial effect.In the empirical test of regulatory penalties and insurance company risks,two transmission paths for regulatory penalties to reduce insurance company risks were innovatively proposed,providing theoretical support for regulatory authorities to clear transmission channels and exert the effects of regulatory penalties.Third,in terms of conclusions and policies,China’s insurance market is in a critical stage of transition from high-speed development to high-quality,and violations in the insurance market need to be curbed urgently.This paper provides policy recommendations for the governance of insurance violations in my country from the perspective of rationalized supervision by insurance regulatory authorities,risk management of insurance companies,legal supervision of insurance consumers,and strengthening information disclosure of insurance companies.It is of great significance to promote the high-quality transformation of my country’s insurance industry and promote the healthy development of the insurance market. |
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