The Impact Of CEO Risk Preference On M&As Charateristics’ And Their Economic Consequences

As an important way for market resources to allocate production factors,Mergers and Acquisitions(M&As)have opened up a convenient channel for enterprises to enter the target market.In recent years,transaction activities in China’s M&As market have become more and more frequent.With the in-depth research of M&As,the role of the managers’ bounded rational behavior has been widely concerned.As the decider of M&A,CEO plays an indispensable role in the process of M&As’ decision and implementation.Therefore,CEO risk preference can directly affects his M&As decision behavior.An effective corporate governance is the basis to the operating of enterprise.It should be considered to ensure the success of M&As.In this context,from the perspective of the CEO risk preference,on the basis of the relevant classical theory and research,we select the initial sample from 2014 to 2019 of China’s A-share listed company M&As events,using Probit model,PSM,and other measurement methods,systematic research the following questions: How does CEO risk preference affect the choice of payment method,size and type of M&As;How does CEO risk preference affect M&As premium and explore the impact of firm characteristic differentiation;How does CEO risk preference affect the economic consequences of M&As and its mechanism? At the same time,on the basis of the above questions,further explore whether corporate governance play an effective supervision role on CEO risk preference.Firstly,this dissertation researches the impact of CEO risk preference on M&As characteristics from three aspects: payment mode,size and type.The results find the level of CEO risk preference can affect the selection of M&As characteristics.CEO with higher risk preference level is more willing to choose cash payment and unrelated M&As,and promote large-scale M&A transactions.In addition,the difference of the industry types and enterprise life cycle also affect the correlation between CEO risk preference and M&A characteristics.Secondly,this dissertation studies the impact of CEO risk preference on M&As premium,and further explores the constrains of corporate governance mechanism on CEO risk preference.CEO with higher risk preference prefer to conduct a high-level premium,and the correlation between CEO risk preference and M&As premium is different in the ownership property and industry category.The research also tests that the internal and external governance mechanisms play an effective supervision role on CEO risk preference in M&As.Finally,this dissertation is tested the the impact of CEO risk preference on M&As performance from two aspects: short-term market performance and long-term financial performance.The higher level of CEO risk preference will promote the better shortterm market performance but the worse long-term financial performance.The empirical results also prove the mediating role of M&As scale and premium between CEO risk preference and M&As performance.Furthuremore,internal control also plays an effective role in restricting the correlation between CEO risk preference and M&As performance.The innovation is mainly as the following three aspects.(1)This dessertation find out the relationship between CEO risk preference and the choices of M&As’ characteritics,enrich the researches on the characteristics of managers’ bounded rational behavior in M&As.(2)This dessertation explores the mediating effect of M&A scale and premium between CEO risk preference and M&As performance.(3)This dessertation discusses the influence of internal and external governance as situational factors on CEO risk preference,constructs a theoretical analysis framework of “CEO risk preference,corporate governance,M&A”.