| Since the reform and opening up,China’s capital market has been developing and growing,but debt capital is still the main source of enterprise financing.With the slowdown of economic growth,the disadvantages of Chinese enterprises relying too much on debt financing have gradually emerged.The sudden outbreak of COVID-19 at the end of 2019 exacerbated the company’s operational risks.At the same time,the company’s investors are also affected by the epidemic to varying degrees and adopt a more cautious attitude in investment,which aggravates the financing risk of the company.Therefore,there are extensive discussions on how to improve the allocation efficiency of debt funds in the context of the normalized epidemic prevention and control.The current study suggests that the company cost of capital in addition to the affected by its business risk,also affected by the company internal and external information asymmetry,so the company under the premise of its operating risk is relatively fixed,reduce the company’s internal and external information asymmetry degree became the key to solve the problem of financing difficulties financing your.As early as 2014 when the "Information Disclosure Through Train" reform,regulators have started to innovatively try to establish exchange inquiry letter mechanism,which is also an important institutional basis for the implementation of registration system.It is precisely because of the existence of inquiry letter mechanism,investors can timely understand the incomplete and inaccurate information disclosure of listed companies,and improve their ability to identify the quality of the company,thus reducing the degree of information asymmetry between investors and listed companies.Today,with the increasing number of listed companies,the number of exchange inquiry letters issued by regulators and the number of questions are also increasing,and the research related to inquiry letters has received more and more attention from the academic world.Today,the inquiry letter of the exchange is no longer limited to the quarterly report,semi-annual report and annual report of listed companies.Some major transactions,such as mergers and acquisitions of listed companies and related party transactions,are also concerned by the inquiry letter of the exchange.Due to the importance of the annual report of listed companies,annual report inquiry letters occupy most of the number of papers and questions in the inquiry letters,which has also become the focus of academic research.At present,in addition to studying the relationship between annual inquiry letter and information disclosure,academic circles pay attention to a series of issues such as annual inquiry letter and corporate governance,audit quality,earnings management,social responsibility and so on.However,these researches on corporate financial behavior do not pay attention to corporate debt financing,and the influence of annual report inquiry letter on corporate debt financing and its mechanism remain to be further studied.For listed companies,on the one hand,the annual report inquiry letter in the form of questions and answers prompts the company to disclose more information about business decisions,improving the amount and availability of corporate information;On the other hand,the annual report inquiry letter is characterized by its professionalism and flexibility to inquire about inaccurate and incomplete information in the company’s annual report,which improves the efficiency and transmission speed of the company’s information.The above reasons will reduce the degree of information asymmetry between listed companies and creditors,and creditors will protect their rights and interests by adjusting the necessary rate of return and adjusting the debt maturity contract after obtaining relevant information,thus affecting the debt financing behavior of listed companies.In addition,inquiry letters also play different roles in different internal and external governance environments.Based on the above background,this thesis selects the samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2014 to 2019,combines normative research and empirical research methods,uses Stata data processing software and Python big data processing technology,and reviews the exchange inquiry letters and corporate debt financing related literature.Combined with the classic game theory method of management,this thesis puts forward the theoretical analysis framework of the influence of the exchange’s annual report inquiry letter on the company’s debt financing ability,and theoretically deduces that the exchange’s annual report inquiry letter has a negative effect on the company’s debt financing ability by affecting the risk compensation and debt maturity required by creditors.Then we examine the direct influence of the exchange’s annual report inquiry letter on the company’s debt financing ability and the indirect influence of the exchange’s annual report inquiry letter on the company’s debt financing ability through the debt capital cost and debt maturity structure.The findings:(1)Annual report inquiry letter significantly reduced the company’s debt financing ability.At the same time,good internal control construction or a high marketization level in the location can restrain the negative impact of annual report inquiry letter on the company’s debt financing ability.It shows that the internal and external governance mechanism is beneficial to improve the confidence of creditors,so as to help the company obtain more debt funds.(2)Annual report inquiry letter reduces the company’s debt financing ability by increasing the risk compensation required by creditors.That is,the annual report inquiry letter increases the risk compensation required by creditors,resulting in higher debt capital cost.When the debt financing cost is higher than the rate of return on investment,the company will reduce the debt financing ratio,which leads to the decline of the debt financing ability of the company.(3)Annual report inquiry letter reduces the debt financing ability of the company by shortening the debt maturity that creditors are willing to provide.That is,the annual inquiry letter shortens the period of time the company can obtain loans.In order to obtain debt funds for investment,the company has to turn long-term debt into shortterm debt,which aggravates the financial risk of the company and leads to the decline of debt financing ability of the company.(4)The annual report inquiry letter not only affects the debt financing ability of the company by changing the debt capital cost and debt maturity structure,but also accelerates the adjustment speed of the company’s capital structure,and this effect is more obvious in the companies with higher debt financing cost or shorter debt maturity structure.The contribution and innovation of this thesis may be reflected in the following aspects: First of all,since the CSRC requested to actively explore non-administrative punitive regulatory measures with timely correction function in 2008,the research on the economic consequences of non-punitive regulatory reform has become increasingly abundant.This thesis focuses on how the stock exchange annual report inquiry letter,which is a means of non-penalized supervision,affects corporate debt financing.It is a new perspective to study the supervision effect and economic consequences of nonpenalized supervision.Secondly,debt capital,as the main source of financing for Chinese enterprises,has been widely concerned by all walks of life.In this thesis,the annual report inquiry letter is included into the influencing factors of corporate debt financing,revealing the negative impact of annual report inquiry letter on corporate debt financing,and the difference under different internal and external governance levels.It is beneficial to expand the research scope of influencing factors of corporate debt financing from the perspective of governance mechanism.Thirdly,based on the decision-making behaviors of the company and external creditors under different circumstances,it is innovative to introduce the exchange annual report inquiry letter to establish a three-stage principal-agent game model of "company → exchange supervision → external creditors".And the annual report of the letter of inquiry to the capital market to convey effective information,by changing the decision of creditors,forcing the company to speed up their own capital structure optimization influence path.Finally,this study focuses on the decision-making process of creditors,starting with the risk compensation required by creditors(debt capital cost)and the uncertainty faced by creditors(debt maturity structure),describes the decision-making behavior of creditors,and puts forward a new research framework on creditor’s decision-making and corporate debt financing behavior.It is proved that the annual report inquiry affects the mechanism of debt capacity by increasing the level of risk compensation required by creditors and the uncertainty of the future. |
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