| According to the statistics of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China in 2019,the number of small and medium-sized enterprises in China has exceeded 30 million,and the number of individual industrial and commercial households has exceeded 70 million.They contribute more than 60% of GDP,more than 70% of technological innovation,and more than 80% of urban laborers are employed.However,these enterprises are facing severe financing difficulties in their further development.With the accumulation of personal wealth,the demand for personal financial asset investment is constantly increasing.There is a serious mismatch between social idle funds and corporate financing difficulties.However,the wealth management products of traditional financial institutions face the challenge of matching individual financing needs with corporate financing needs.Crowdfunding enables investors to bypass intermediaries and directly invest in related financing loans,which improves the matching efficiency of social idle funds and loans,and plays an essential role in promoting economic growth.However,in the crowdfunding environment,most investors are non-professional investors,lacking professional investment knowledge and investment time.In the case of information asymmetry,it is challenging to identify high-quality loans,making it difficult for crowdfunding to play its due value.Therefore,sorting out the impact mechanism of special investment signals on the investment behavior of potential investors and improving the matching efficiency between investors and financing loans has important practical significance for the healthy and sustainable development of the crowdfunding economy.Based on platform participation investment,leader investment mechanism,signaling theory,herding effect,risk diversification,responsibility diffusion,intelligent investment,investor behavior,and other related theories and literature reviews,we propose corresponding assumptions and select appropriate variables to construct an econometric model.We use the relevant data from the crowdfunding platform to verify the hypothesis,and develop four sub-studies.Firstly,based on the research perspective of platform participation investment,our study explores the action mechanism of the signal of platform participation investment on potential investors,and in-depth discusses the optimal time and optimal ratio of platform investment.The results show that platform participation can enhance investors’ herding effect.There is a U-shaped mechanism between platform investment time and financing efficiency,and the platform’s early investment as a highquality signal can increase investors’ willingness to invest and improve financing efficiency.On the contrary,if the platform invests too late,it is easy to cause investors’ doubts and responsibility diffusion,which will reduce investment willingness.There is also a U-shaped mechanism between the platform investment ratio and financing efficiency.With the increase of the platform investment ratio,the cost of investment signal increases,and investors’ investment intention increases.However,when the proportion of platform investment exceeds a certain value,the responsibility diffusion mechanism will be triggered,and investors’ perceived contribution to loan and investment intention will decrease.Secondly,based on rational investment and herding,our study investigates the impact mechanism of intelligent investment on herding.The research results show that in the presence of intelligent investment,the herd effect of investors still exists,but the intensity of the herd effect will decrease.The impact of intelligent investment on investors’ herding will increase as the proportion of intelligent investment increases.In addition,the proportion of intelligent investment has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between platform investment and herding;that is,when the platform invests in a loan,it will enhance the investment willingness of investors,as the proportion of intelligent investment in the project increases,the herding caused by platform participation investment will weaken.Thirdly,our study first sorts out the influencing factors of investors’ choice of intelligent investment,and further explores the impact of intelligent investment on investment return and risk.The research results show that older,private entrepreneurs and experienced investors are more likely to use intelligent investment;female investors and highly educated investors are less likely to use automatic bidding tools,but females are more likely to choose quick bidding tools.Interestingly,although workers are the target group of platform design intelligent investment tools,the research results found that workers only prefer free automatic bidding tools.In addition,intelligent investment behavior causes a slight decrease in investment returns,but it is also accompanied by lower investment risk,maintaining a certain balance between the two.Finally,based on the leader investment mechanism,our research explores the impact mechanism of the signal of leader’s investment on the excess financing.The results show that when there is leader’s investment in the loan,both the leader investment of enterprise and the leader investment of individual can improve the excess financing.And with the increase of the proportion of lead investment,the proportion of excess financing also increases.Compared with the leader investment of individual,the leader investment proportion of enterprise plays a stronger role in the excess financing of loans.In addition,the research carried out the analysis of cross-platform information for the leader of enterprise,and found that compared with enterprises with low registered capital,the leader investment proportion of enterprise with high registered capital had a stronger effect on the excess financing,which expanded the relevant research on cross-platform information of leader investment mechanism and enriched the relevant research on equity crowdfunding. |
