Non-Controlling Shareholders Governance Mechanism And Financing Behavior In Mixed Ownership Reform

Mixed ownership reform is an important form of realization of the basic socialist economic system,and it is of great significance at the macro and micro levels of China’s economic system.Since the reform and opening up,with the rapid transition of the economic system from a "planned economy as the mainstay with market regulation as a supplement" to a"socialist market economy",the mixed ownership reform has gradually deepened,and overall positive progress and remarkable results have been achieved.The "14th Five-Year Plan" period is a key period for my country to fully start a new journey of building a powerful modern socialist country.The party and the country have particularly emphasized in the "14th FiveYear Plan" to deepen the reform of mixed ownership.Based on the new development stage,to explore the fundamental logic of mixed-ownership reform,analyze the internal source of heterogeneous property rights capital’s governance role,test the policy effect of mixed-ownership reform,and then clarify the development path of mixed-ownership reform,these are issues that should be paid attention to by the current theoretical and practical circles.The essence of mixed ownership reform is to introduce noncontrolling shareholders with heterogeneous capital attributes,form a property rights structure in which capitals of different ownerships jointly hold shares,and improve corporate governance efficiency by means of"resource complementarity" and "mutual checks and balances" of multiproperty capital.It can be seen from this that the key to mixed ownership reform is to form an effective governance mechanism for non-controlling shareholders.However,the existing research on the governance mechanism of non-controlling shareholders in mixed ownership reform is mostly based on formal institutional arrangements,focusing on "equity governance" and "high-level governance" perspective,not only does not pay enough attention to the governance power based on information resources and "informal systems",but also ignores the coupling relationship between different dimensions of the governance mechanism of non-controlling shareholders.Therefore,the exploration of the governance effectiveness of non-controlling shareholders needs to be further expanded and deepened.In addition,the role of the non-controlling shareholder governance mechanism and policy effects in the mixed ownership reform also have a theoretical "lag" problem.On the one hand,the mixed ownership reform has entered a new phase of "two-way mixed reform" and "classified mixed reform".However,most of the existing literature on mixed ownership reform focuses on state-owned enterprises and explores the economic consequences of introducing private property rights in state-owned enterprises,and has not paid enough attention to the mixed reform path of "state-owned capital entering non-state-owned enterprises".On the other hand,mixed ownership reform is a property rights reform,which has a complementary logic and consistency with the capital structure itself,but the existing literature rarely takes financing behavior as the starting point to examine the governance effect of heterogeneous property rights and non-controlling shareholders.The causal logic of the research is a research gap that needs to be filled urgently.In view of this,this paper focuses on the core issue of "the governance mechanism and financing behavior of non-controlling shareholders in mixed ownership reform",follows the logical thinking of "theoretical origin-practical status-model construction-empirical test-case evidence",and discusses the following five aspects of progressive content:First,this paper deducts and summarizes the current practice of mixed ownership reform,and finds that:The development process of mixed ownership reform is highly consistent with the pace of my country’s economic system changes,state-owned enterprise reform and private enterprise development.It can follow the evolutionary vein of "exploration and brewing-growth and leap-adjustment and improvement-deepening and acceleration",which can be divided into "forms".There are four stages of mixing,"capital" mixing,"property" mixing and "mechanism" mixing.After more than 40 years of experience accumulation and development deepening,the mixed ownership reform has achieved many positive results.The key lies in the formation of an effective non-controlling shareholder governance mechanism.Second,this paper uses the multi-dimensional governance data set of non-controlling shareholders of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 to conduct theoretical analysis,model construction and data fitting on the governance mechanism of noncontrolling shareholders in mixed ownership reform.The research shows that the mixed ownership reform includes the first type of mixed reform situation of "state-owned enterprises introducing social capital" and the second type of mixed reform situation of "state-owned capital taking shares in non-state-owned enterprises".The governance mechanism of noncontrolling shareholders of heterogeneous property rights capital in the mixed ownership reform should be based on the perspective of "formal system" and "informal system",and comprehensively consider from the three dimensions of "equity governance","high-level governance" and"network governance" The power of non-controlling shareholders to participate in governance comes from "resource base" and "institutional arrangement",and the governance effect of non-controlling shareholders includes "resource effect" and "check and balance effect".Third,this paper conducts a theoretical analysis and data test on the impact of the non-controlling shareholder governance mechanism on financing behavior in the first type of mixed-ownership reform,and finds that:The main contradictions existing in the financing of state-owned enterprises lie in "high leverage" and the prominent problem of "ineffective occupation of debt capital".In the first type of mixed-ownership reform scenario of "introducing private capital to state-owned enterprises",the participation of non-controlling shareholders in governance can speed up the adjustment of the capital structure of mixed-ownership reformed stateowned enterprises.In terms of mechanism of action,based on the "manager view" and "political view",non-controlling shareholders’ participation in governance mainly uses "improving the supervisory and incentive mechanism for executives" as an intermediary to increase the speed of capital structure adjustment in state-owned enterprises.Although the "soft budget constraint" is also an important reason for the slow dynamic adjustment of the capital structure of state-owned enterprises,the governance participation of non-controlling shareholders has not played a significant role in correcting it.In terms of influencing factors,from the perspective of "classified mixed-ownership reform",the impact of the noncontrolling shareholder governance mechanism on the speed of capital structure adjustment varies with industry competition and economic location.The State Council’s overall policy of "classified mixed-ownership reform" should be actively implemented to improve reform efficiency.Fourth,this paper conducts a theoretical analysis and data test on the impact of the non-controlling shareholder governance mechanism on financing behavior in the second type of mixed-ownership reform situation,and finds that:The main contradiction in financing of private enterprises is"financing difficulty".In the second type of mixed-ownership reform scenario of "state-owned capital entering non-state-owned enterprises",the participation of non-controlling shareholders in governance can improve the preference of private enterprises for debt financing.In terms of influencing factors,based on two levels of external environmental factors and internal characteristic factors,from the dual perspectives of financial institutions’ willingness to lend and corporate capital needs,the effect of non-controlling shareholder governance participation on private enterprise debt financing preference is more significant when the level of financial development is higher,the degree of industry competition is lower,the asset can be mortgaged,and the net operating cash flow is lower.In terms of influence paths,the governance mechanism of non-controlling shareholders mainly affects the debt financing preferences of private enterprises through two paths of "improving debt financing capacity" and"changing debt financing willingness",which can alleviate corporate financing constraints,optimize the quality of information disclosure,improve management’s risk appetite,and reduce the cost of agency.Fifth,the article focuses on the situation of "two-way" mixedownership reform,and follows the classification reform principle of"control if appropriate,participate in participation if appropriate",selects the benchmarking enterprises of mixed-ownership reform,China Unicom,Sinopharm Group,Gree Electric Appliances,and Shangfeng Cement,and conducts a multi-case comparative study.The study found that in these mixed-ownership reform enterprises,non-controlling shareholders have played an active role in governance by virtue of their governance power in various dimensions,and state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital have achieved efficient synergy and symbiosis.The case analysis can draw the following inspirations:The governance mechanism of non-controlling shareholders in mixed ownership reform should be comprehensively considered from the perspectives of "equity governance","high-level governance" on formal systems and "network governance" based on informal systems;The mixed-ownership reform should focus on introducing strategic investors with high matching degree,high coordination and high sense of identity;The mixed-ownership reform should strengthen the in-depth integration of multiple shareholders in governance management,business operation,cultural construction,etc.;Mixed ownership reform should be conducive to the improvement of enterprise efficiency and the optimization of capital distribution;mixed ownership reform should pay attention to the demands of private capital mixed reform,and deepen the "two-way" mixed reform according to the principle of competitive neutrality;The mixed-ownership reform should activate the multi-capital combination model,and promote the deepening of the reform according to the principle of "independence if it is appropriate,control if it is appropriate,and participation if it is appropriate".In general,the innovations of this paper mainly include four aspects:First,this paper builds a theoretical model of the governance mechanism of non-controlling shareholders in mixed ownership reform.Second,this paper pays attention to the governance role of heterogeneous property rights capital in the context of "two-way" mixed ownership reform.Third,this paper analyzes the logical relationship between the governance mechanism of non-controlling shareholders and corporate financing behavior in mixed ownership reform.Fourth,this paper demonstrates the power base and governance effect of the role of heterogeneous property rights capital in the mixed ownership reform.The theoretical significance of this paper is that:on the one hand,it expands the literature on the influencing factors of corporate financing behavior from the individual level of the non-controlling shareholder governance mechanism,and also enriches the literature on the economic consequences of the non-controlling shareholder governance mechanism;on the other hand,in-depth analysis of the logical relationship,action mechanism and influence path of the non-controlling shareholder governance mechanism affecting corporate financing behavior in the "twoway mixed reform" scenario,"two-way" expands the relevant literature on the policy effect of mixed ownership reform.The practical significance of this paper is:on the one hand,it helps to clarify the internal logic of the governance effect of non-controlling shareholders with heterogeneous property rights,and can promote the improvement of governance mechanisms in mixed-ownership companies,which has guiding significance for curbing the private interests of controlling shareholders and opportunistic behaviors of executives derived from single property rights;on the other hand,it helps to show the whole picture of mixed ownership reform,can guide all kinds of capital to actively participate in mixed ownership reform,and has reference significance for implementing the top-level design of the State Council’s"promoting mixed ownership reform by classification".