| The Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform in 2013,which proposed to actively develop the mixed-ownership economy,promote state-owned enterprises(SOEs)to perfect the modern corporate system and support the healthy development of the non-public economy.Then,the CCCPC and the State Council published the following documents in 2015: Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises([2015]No.22),Opinions on the Development of Mixed Ownership Economy of State-owned Enterprises([2015] No.54)and Opinions on Reform and Improvement of the Stateowned Assets Management System([2015] No.63)and so on.All of them expounded on promoting the mixed ownership reform of SOEs.The purpose of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs is not to withdraw state-owned shares from SOEs,but to bring non-state capital into SOEs,improve resource allocation and utilization efficiency,optimize the ownership structure,enhance the corporate governance mechanism,stimulate operational vitality and innovation capabilities and promote the stable,fast,healthy and sustainable development of SOEs.Therefore,it is necessary to clarify the selection mechanism of ownership structure of SOEs under the background of mixed ownership reform,the impact of ownership structure of mixed ownership SOEs on corporate performance,and the transmission mechanism and path of ownership structure’s impact on corporate performance through high-level governance structure and exit threat of non-state-owned blockholders.These are the key problems that must be solved in the process of mixed ownership reform of SOEs in China.Based on the above introduction,in light of the modern enterprise theories and methods,theoretical model construction combined with logical reasoning,empirical analysis and other research methods,this paper,from both theoretical and empirical perspectives,studies ownership structure selection mechanism of SOEs under the background of mixed ownership reform and its impact on corporate performance.The main research contents and conclusions are as follows.(1)This paper constructs a mathematical model to theoretically reveal the internal relationship between the public welfare functions and ownership structure of SOEs under the background of mixed ownership reform.Then it selects the samples of stateowned listed companies from 2010 to 2018 to empirically test the relationship between public welfare functions and ownership structure of SOEs.The following theoretical research results are obtained.Without changing the state-owned attribute,when implementing the mixed ownership reform,SOEs with low public welfare functions can choose not only the balanced ownership structure of state-owned shareholders,nonstate-owned blockholders who do not substantially participate in corporate governance and medium and medium and small shareholders,but also the balanced ownership structure of state-owned shareholders and medium and small shareholders.SOEs with higher public welfare functions ought to sell part of their shares to non-state-owned blockholders who substantially participate in corporate governance and small and medium-sized shareholders,so as to form a balanced ownership structure in which state-owned shareholders,non-state-owned blockholders who substantially participate in corporate governance and small and medium-sized shareholders jointly hold shares.SOEs with the highest public welfare functions are not suitable for the implementation of mixed ownership reform,and state-owned sole proprietorship is the feasible choice for them.The results of empirical research based on the samples of state-owned listed companies formed and developed in the previous reform of SOEs verify the correctness and rationality of the results of the theoretical model.Compared with SOEs with low public welfare functions,the shareholding proportion of non-state-owned shareholders in SOEs with higher public welfare functions is lower.Besides,there are more likely to be non-state-owned blockholders,who are more likely to appoint directors,supervisors and senior executives to participate in corporate governance substantially in SOEs with higher public welfare functions.(2)In light of the assumption that the state-owned shareholders and non-stateowned blockholders of SOEs have different shareholding ratios,different rights in business decisions,different interest demands,different business goals and different incentive and restraint methods for senior executives,an optimal decision-making model among state-owned shareholder,non-state-owned blockholder and senior executive is constructed to theoretically reveal the influence mechanism of the public welfare functions and the shareholder ownership structure of mixed-ownership SOEs on operating performance and market value.Then,it tested the results of the theoretical model empirically by using Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share state-owned listed companies from 2010 to 2018 as a sample.The following main conclusions are obtained.The public welfare functions undertaken by SOEs will present a significantly negative impact on the operating performance.Strengthening non-state-owned shareholder’s participation in the substantive corporate governance of SOEs and increasing the degree of equity integration between state-owned shareholders and nonstate-owned shareholders can remarkably improve the operating performance of SOEs.It is achievable to improve the market value of SOEs by optimizing the shareholder ownership structure while keeping the public welfare functions undertaken by SOEs unchanged.(3)Taking the A-share state-owned listed companies from 2010 to 2018 as the sample,this paper brings the degree of equity integration,high-level governance structure and comprehensive performance of SOEs into the same research framework.The degree of equity integration is measured by the comparative relationship between the shareholding ratio of state-owned shareholder and that of non-state-owned shareholder among the top ten shareholders of SOEs.The high-level governance structure is measured by the proportion of directors,supervisors and senior executives appointed by non-state-owned shareholders in the top ten shareholders.In light of principal component analysis,the paper constructs comprehensive performance indicators covering social performance and economic performance of state-owned listed companies.It examines the impact of the degree of equity integration on comprehensive performance and the mediating effect of high-level governance structure between the degree of equity integration and comprehensive performance from the perspective of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in high-level governance.The following research results are obtained.Generally speaking,the degree of equity integration of China’s SOEs will have a significant positive impact on the comprehensive performance and the proportion of directors,supervisors and senior executives appointed by non-state-owned shareholders.The higher the degree of equity integration,the non-state-owned shareholders of SOEs are more inclined to appoint directors,supervisors and senior executives to SOEs.High-level governance structure has a significant mediating effect between the degree of equity integration and comprehensive performance.Improving the degree of equity integration and strengthening the matching between equity structure and high-level governance structure can improve the comprehensive performance of SOEs on the whole.This conclusion proves the rationality of China’s SOEs implementing mixed ownership reform by introducing nonstate-owned capital.The role of the degree of equity integration in improving the comprehensive performance of SOEs is stronger in central SOEs than that in local SOEs.At the same time,improving the degree of equity integration between state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders in central SOEs can better improve the proportion of non-state-owned shareholders appointing directors,supervisors and senior executives in the high-level governance structure of SOEs,and correspondingly improve the comprehensive performance of SOEs.Compared with the SOEs that are not absolutely controlled by state-owned shareholders,the degree of equity integration plays a stronger role in improving the comprehensive performance of SOEs that are absolutely controlled by state-owned shareholders.At the same time,in SOEs absolutely controlled by state-owned shareholders,improving the degree of equity integration between state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders can better improve the proportion of non-state-owned shareholders appointing directors,supervisors and senior executives in the high-level governance structure of SOEs,and correspondingly improve the comprehensive performance of SOEs.(4)This paper takes the A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2018 as the sample.The degree of equity integration is measured by the comparative relationship between the shareholding ratio of state-owned shareholder and that of non-state-owned shareholders among the top ten shareholders of SOEs.The degree of exit threat of non-state-owned blockholders is measured by the product of liquidity and the degree of competition of non-state-owned shareholders among the top ten shareholders.Tobin Q is measured by the market value of SOEs.This paper studies the impact of the degree of equity integration on the market value of SOEs and the possible mediating effect of the exit threat of non-state-owned blockholders between the degree of equity integration and market value from the perspective of the exit threat of non-state-owned blockholders.Furthermore,it studies the heterogeneity of the relationship between SOEs’ equity integration degree of different administrative levels,different industry competition levels,different scales,the exit threat of non-stateowned blockholders and market value.The following main conclusions are obtained.Improving the degree of equity integration is conducive to enhancing the market value of SOEs.The exit threat of non-state-owned blockholders plays a mediating role between the degree of equity integration and the market value of SOEs.The role of the degree of equity integration in improving the market value of SOEs is stronger in central SOEs than that in local SOEs,stronger in specific functional SOEs than that in commercial competitive SOEs,and stronger in small-scale SOEs than that in large-scale SOEs.In central SOEs,specific functional SOEs and small-scale SOEs,improving the degree of equity integration can not only improve the degree of exit threat of non-stateowned blockholders,but also improve the market value of SOEs.Compared with the existing literature,the characteristics and possible innovations of this paper are reflected in the following aspects:(1)When discussing the ownership structure of SOEs,most of the existing literature only roughly divide shareholders of SOEs into state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders.Based on the differences in ability and motivation of non-state-owned shareholders to participate in the corporate governance of SOEs,this paper divides non-state-owned shareholders into non-state-owned blockholders who substantively participate in corporate governance,non-state-owned blockholders who do not substantively participate in corporate governance,and decentralized small and medium-sized shareholders.This paper studies the ownership structure selection mechanism of SOEs with different public welfare functions in the context of mixed ownership reform from both theoretical and empirical aspects.The research can not only refine the selection results of the ownership structure of SOEs,but also construct an ownership structure that meets the requirements of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs and achieves the goal of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs.It can not only provide strong theoretical support and empirical evidence for the central and local governments and related departments at all levels to formulate scientific policies and systems of mixed ownership reform of SOEs,but also make up for the deficiencies of existing research in perspectives,content,methods,and results to enrich and perfect the theory of ownership structure selection of SOEs.(2)This paper incorporates the public welfare functions of SOEs,ownership structure between state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders,executive behavior and corporate performance into the same research framework.The paper constructs an optimal decision-making model among state-owned shareholders,non-state-owned blockholders,and senior executives.It theoretically reveals the impact of public welfare functions and shareholder ownership structure of SOEs on the corporate performance.Besides,the paper selects Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share stateowned listed companies from 2010 to 2018 as the sample to conduct an empirical test.It empirically clarifies the internal relationship between the public welfare functions of SOEs,shareholder ownership structure and corporate performance.The research results of this paper theoretically expand the multitask principal-agent theory between multiple shareholders and executives,and practically provide theoretical basis and implementation path for the SOEs to optimize the ownership structure and control structure under the constraints of public welfare functions,and to smoothly promote the mixed ownership reform.(3)Although the existing literature has studied the impact of ownership structure and high-level governance structure on operating behavior and corporate performance respectively,it does not clarify the impact of the degree of equity integration of SOEs on the overall corporate performance and the mediating role of high-level governance structure.Based on the empirical research on the samples of state-owned listed companies formed and developed in the previous reform of SOEs in China,this paper clarifies the transmission mechanism and path of the degree of equity integration of SOEs affecting the comprehensive performance through the high-level governance structure.It provides empirical evidence for the decision-making of equity structure and control structure in the process of mixed ownership reform of SOEs.Based on the perspective of high-level governance structure(internal governance mechanism),this paper makes a beneficial supplement to the relevant research results in the field of corporate ownership structure.(4)The existing literature focuses on the impact of different types of shareholders’ shareholding on corporate value and the impact of the exit threat of blockholders on the production and operation activities.Few literature pays attention to the mediating role of the exit threat of non-state-owned blockholders between the degree of equity integration of SOEs and the corporate value.Based on the research results on the relationship between the degree of equity integration of SOEs,the exit threat of nonstate-owned blockholders and market value,this paper expounds the impact of the degree of equity integration of SOEs on market value and the mediating effect of the exit threat of non-state-owned blockholders.It provides a decision-making reference for China’s SOEs to give full play to the external governance role of the exit threat of nonstate-owned blockholders and optimize the corporate governance mechanism of SOEs in the process of mixed ownership reform.From the perspective of the exit threat of non-state-owned blockholders(external governance mechanism),it enriches the relevant research results in the field of corporate ownership structure. |
