| With the improvement of the economic level and the rapid development of innovative technologies,the huge environmental uncertainty faced by the subsidiaries has changed the role of the subsidiaries significantly.This kind of uncertainty makes the parent company lack the necessary market knowledge and product knowledge for related businesses,and it is difficult to clearly understand the business of its subsidiaries and fully grasp the operating conditions of its subsidiaries.At the same time,due to changes in the external environment,subsidiaries must take the initiative to embed in the local network environment,understand market information and expand market share,so that the role of subsidiaries will gradually change from passive recipients to independent actors with innovative spirit and practice.In addition,among listed companies in China,the "moral hazard factor" and "tunnelling effect" of potential parent companies make it difficult to protect the interests of stakeholders other than the holding company,and the interest system between parent and subsidiary companies that should be balanced is tilted towards the parent company.In the absence of sufficient autonomy,the strategic mistakes of the parent company will also cause risk to be transferred to the subsidiary.Therefore,subsidiary autonomy has become a more and more important research content in the research of parent-subsidiary relationships.At present,the research on the subsidiary autonomy in China is still in the theoretical analysis stage,but there is no systematic research on the interaction mechanism and process between them.The conclusions drawn from this study may have logical leap,and it is difficult to fully reveal the governance situation of the parent-subsidiary company’s structural practice.Besides,the concept of subsidiary autonomy has not been fully understood.Due to the complexity and multidimensional nature of the autonomy of subsidiaries,in addition to being formally allocated by the parent company,it can also be developed through subsidiaries.However,existing research does not clearly distinguish the types of subsidiary autonomy,and most studies use a single index to analyze them.Therefore,based on the above reasons,this paper firstly analyzes the existing literature,and finds that the autonomy of subsidiaries is formed under the interaction of top-down structural power and bottom-up self-organization governance.The organizational literature provides insights into the influence of organizational dimensions(formalization and centralization)on management roles.The literature on self-organization governance emphasizes the degrees of freedom that subsidiary owners,supervisors,and managers can exploit themselves and their impact on organizational outcomes.Based on the two dimensions of strategic consistency and interest consistency of parent and subsidiary companies,through the interactive process of "cognitive gap-conflict generation-conflict resolution",the conclusion is drawn that proper organizational control and self-organization governance can bring benefits to enterprises.Sustainable development not only provides opportunities for subsidiaries to actively participate in strategic choices and corporate decision-making,but also provides a foundation for the cooperation between the parent company and other stakeholders.Secondly,based on the research of "structure-behavior-performance" and the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2019,this paper studies the influence of different types of subsidiary autonomy on the controlling shareholders’ private behavior,and analyzes the differential governance effects of different subsidiary autonomy,and draws the following empirical conclusions:(1)Both formal and informal autonomy can effectively inhibit the controlling shareholders’ private behavior.As formal autonomy is explicitly authorized by the parent company after bargaining between the parent company and the subsidiary company,the subsidiary company improves its legitimacy through explicit provisions such as contracts and articles of association in its management activities,thus effectively constraining the private behavior of controlling shareholders.Informal autonomy held by a subsidiary is autonomy developed by the parent company without formal authorization,which is actually acquiesced in by the parent company.Through the development and utilization of internal and external resources,the subsidiary strengthens the competitive advantage of the enterprise,increases the participation of external stakeholders and the benefits of controlling shareholders’ control rights,thus effectively constraining the controlling shareholders’ private behavior.(2)Internal supervision and executive incentives play an intermediary role between the formal autonomy of subsidiaries and the private interests of controlling shareholders.Through the analysis of the subsidiary’s formal autonomy,we find the influence mechanism of "subsidiary’s formal autonomy—parent company’s process control and behavior control ’bargaining’—parent company’s private behavior".(3)The level of value creation and information transparency play an intermediary role between the informal autonomy of subsidiaries and the private interests of controlling shareholders.Through the study of various aspects of informal autonomy,subsidiaries have found the influence mechanism of " informal autonomy—parent company’s result-controlled ’bargaining’—the controlling shareholders’ private behavior ".(4)The external environment plays a moderating role in the relationship between subsidiary autonomy and the controlling shareholders’ private behavior.Among them.industry competition can effectively regulate the relationship between the informal autonomy of subsidiaries and the private interests of controlling shareholders,but it is not significant in the governance effect of the formal autonomy of subsidiaries.In areas with perfect systems,the formal autonomy of subsidiaries has a stronger negative correlation with the private behavior of the controlling shareholders,while in areas with backward systems,the informal autonomy of subsidiaries has a stronger negative correlation with the private behavior of the controlling shareholders.(5)Internal factors play a moderating role in the relationship between the autonomy of subsidiaries and the controlling shareholders’ private behavior.The degree of decentralization and management ability can effectively moderate the relationship between the informal autonomy of subsidiaries and the controlling shareholders’ private behavior,but it is not significant in the formal autonomy of subsidiaries.(6)Further analysis shows that in state-owned enterprises,the formal autonomy of subsidiaries has a more obvious inhibitory effect on the controlling shareholders’ private behavior.In non-state-owned enterprises,the informal autonomy of subsidiaries inhibits the controlling shareholders’ private behavior more obviously.In addition,the informal autonomy of subsidiaries can effectively enhance the enterprise value,while the formal autonomy of subsidiaries is positively related to enterprise value.The innovations of this paper are as follows:(1)Through the theoretical analysis of organizational structure and self-organization governance,the interactive process of"bargaining" between parent and subsidiary companies based on strategy and interests is discovered,which enriches the theory of "two-way governance" between parent and subsidiary companies.Existing research has begun to pay attention to the positive governance effect of subsidiary autonomy,but the interactive relationship between subsidiary and parent company is still unclear.Therefore,it becomes crucial to understand how structural dimensions and selforganizing governance together affect organizational performance.Through theoretical analysis,this paper finds that the autonomy of subsidiaries is formed under the interaction of top-down structural power and bottom-up self-organization governance.(2)By sorting out the research thread of subsidiary autonomy,this paper divides subsidiary autonomy into formal autonomy and informal autonomy from the perspective of subsidiaries,and clarifies the confusion of definition and measurement of subsidiary autonomy in current theoretical research,which provides theoretical reference for the study of parent-subsidiary relationship.Subsidiary autonomy is complicated,dynamic and multidimensional.These dimensions are not clearly defined in the enterprise,and they are often too simple.By distinguishing different types of subsidiary autonomy,this paper explains different governance forms of subsidiary’s "discourse power" in the process of parent-subsidiary structure,and identifies different governance effects of different types of subsidiary autonomy.(3)Through the analysis of the type of subsidiary autonomy and the influencing mechanism of controlling shareholders’ private behavior,it is found that the formal autonomy and informal autonomy of subsidiary have different mechanisms for the governance effect,and the two-way interaction effect between parent and subsidiary companies is empirically tested.This paper reveals the action path and situational factors of subsidiaries on the controlling shareholders’ private behaviors,identifies the different governance effects of different types of subsidiary autonomy,and provides experience and reference for the sustainable development of subsidiaries. |
