| In recent years,the government has invested heavily in the development of inclusive finance,but the effect is not satisfactory.The phenomenon of “farmers are afraid of loans and banks are reluctant to lend” is still exist,especially small farmers are more to be financial exclusion.This has led us to think why it is difficult for farmers to obtain formal financial loans.Asymmetric information and the lack of an effective contract mechanism have resulted in high transaction costs for financial transactions,which has made farmers’ loan lending contradiction.In this context,based on the transaction cost theory,this paper analyzes the impact of transaction costs on the formal lending behavior of farmers,and provides a realistic basis for reducing the transaction costs signed by farmers and bank and establishing a low transaction cost inclusive financial supply system.It is of great significance to solve the bottleneck problem in the agricultural loan market.This paper starts from the perspective of micro-subjects of farmers,First,try to construct a theoretical analysis framework that affects the formal lending behavior of farmers.Secondly,using the field survey data of small farmers in Guangdong Province in 2018,combined with data description and theoretical deduction,it proves that the high transaction cost is the main reason for small farmers to be bound by formal credit,and combined with the characteristics of the agricultural loan market,constructed the index system of farmers’ loan transaction costs.Thirdly,using the measurement method to analyze the transaction costs affect the formal lending behavior of farmers,including lending channel selection and lending decision-making behavior;Finally,taking the two modes of “bank + rural financial service station +farmers” and “government + bank + insurance company + farmers” in Guangdong Province as a case,in order to explore scientific and reasonable institutional arrangements and governance structure design,so as to save transaction costs.The main conclusions of this paper are summarized as follows:(1)Using data descriptions,48.8% of small farmers who were subject to credit constraints in the sample area were due to high transaction costs..(2)In terms of the choice of actual lending channels for farmers,the study found that farmers’ expectations and actual lending channels are highly biased,and informal financial channels are the main lending channels for low-and middle-income farmers,which is banlanced on transaction costs and personal utility.Empirical research shows that transaction costs are the decisive factor affecting the choice of actual borrowing channels for farmers.Empirical research shows that transaction costs are the determining factors affecting the choice of actual borrowing channels for farmers.Under the premise of controlling the personal characteristics and family characteristics of farmers,who have relatives and friends working in the bank,have formal loan experience,whether there is mortgage or guarantee,which significantly affects the choice of farmers’ borrowing channels;the distance between farmers and banks is significantly negative,which affects farmers’ borrowing channels selection..The above factors indicate that compared with the formal financial channels,the information of the informal financial channel transactions is transparent,no geographical location restrictions,and the lending procedures are simple and no mortgage or guarantee is required,which can directly reduce the information search cost,transportation cost and execution cost of the borrowers and the lenders.Which makes it easier for rational farmers to choose informal financial channels.(3)In the study of farmers’ formal lending decision-making behavior,we use the Heckman model.The empirical results show that under the premise of controlling the individual characteristics and family characteristics of farmers,farmers have relatives or friends working in the bank and have formal loan experience,which will reduce the information of both parties,reducing the cost of information search,which is benefit for farmers to get formal financial loans;although expenses on human relationship increases the additional cost of transactions,for the special existence of China’s relational loans,the availability of formal loans for farmers is improved;The transportation cost is the objective cost incurred by the contract signing.The closer the farmer is to the bank,the better it is to obtain formal borrowing;The farmer have the collateral or guarantor,maintains the stability of the loan contract,reduces the post-loan supervision cost,and thus increases the possibility of loan acquisition.The size of the formal loan amount is positively affected by expenses on human relationship and the past borrowing experience has a significant negative impact.Farmers have mortgages or guarantees,and it is more likely to get more borrowing money.(4)In the case study,dissect the operation mechanism and formation motivation of “bank + financial service station + farmers”in Laolong Town,Heyuan City,and the“government + bank + insurance company”model in Sanshui District,Foshan City.It is concluded that the two models can effectively reduce the transaction costs of pre-,post-loan and post-loan transactions between the farmers and the farmers.That is to say,in the case where the rights of the parties to the transaction are clearly defined and the division of labor is professional,the effective use of informal organizations as institutional arrangements for rural intermediaries can reduce the cost of lending transactions in traditional silver-agricultural contractual relationships. |
