| In recent decades,disasters have become increasingly frequent,resulting in massive property destruction and loss of life,and decreased social stability and economic development.The disaster relief model of “government-led,multiparticipation” has been widely recognized.Enterprises,with their financial and material resources,technology and resource allocation,play an increasingly important role in the process of disaster relief.However,the enterprises’ motivations for disaster relief charity are not simple.Taking the disaster system composed of government and enterprises as the research object,the dissertation deeply discusses the strategy choice of the government and enterprises in the disaster relief activities.The research is carried out from three aspects: the decision-making mechanism of the government and enterprises,factors affecting the choice of government and enterprises strategies,government supervision and the dishonest behavior of enterprises in disaster relief.It has important theoretical and practical significance to explore the feasibility of coordinated disaster relief between government and enterprises.The main conclusions and innovations are as follows.The dissertation establishes a differential game model of the government and an enterprise.The differential game theory is introduced in to the decision-making problem of both the government and the enterprise during the process of disaster relief.The cost-sharing contract is proposed to encourage enterprises to provide disaster relief.Through the comparative analysis of non-cooperative contract,cost-sharing contract and cooperative contract,the decision-making mechanisms of the government and the enterprise are discussed,and the Pareto optimal decision-making model was studied.The dissertation introduces corporate competition and consumer behavior into the government-enterprise disaster relief strategy model to explore the impact of different factors on the decision-making between the government and enterprises.First,considering a disaster relief system composed of the government and two competitive enterprises,the dissertation discusses the impact of competition intensity on the government’s and enterprises’ disaster relief decisions.Second,in order to bring the model closer to reality,the consumer reference price effect is introduced into the differential game model to discuss the impact of consumer behavior on the decisionmaking of both the government and enterprise.At the same time,on the basis of the government’s cost-sharing strategy,the bilateral subsidy strategy is creatively proposed to further optimize the decision-making behavior of the government and enterprises.Considering the social supervision,the dissertation establishes an evolutionary game model of corporate dishonesty and government supervision,discusses the longterm evolutionary game problem of corporate integrity and government supervision,explores the mechanism of social supervision’s impact on corporate integrity and government supervision,analyzes the results of evolutionary games under different levels of social supervision,provides theoretical support and suggestions for better supervision of enterprises’ disaster relief. |
