| Since the beginning of the 21 st century,the public health emergencies have been frequent,especially the outbreak of COVID-19 at the end of 2019,which not only brought huge losses to people’s lives and property,but also brought huge challenges to the country’s emergency management system.At the same time,with the in-depth development of globalization,the connections around the world are becoming more and more frequent.Public health emergencies are far from being handled by a single organization or department.Instead,countries,regions,and departments need to implement multi-subject and multi-level coordinated prevention and control to ensure that public health emergencies can be brought under control as soon as possible.However,in reality,due to the different goals,status,and interests of various subjects,the contradictions of prevention and control are prominent.How to sort out the multi-agent game relationship involved in the process of public health emergency prevention and control,deeply analyze the key factors affecting the emergency prevention and control among various subjects,and put forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions has become an urgent problem to be solved in the emergency prevention and control of public health emergencies.Therefore,based on the comprehensive use of synergy theory,game theory,and group behavior theory,this paper studies the multi-agent prevention and control of public health emergencies by combining the methods of system modeling,game theory and simulation.By constructing a theoretical analysis framework for multi-agent prevention and control of public health emergencies,the game relationship between the public,the public and the local government,between the public,the local government and the central government,and between various countries are modeled and analyzed.A number of prevention and control systems have been formed,including the grass-roots prevention and control subsystem among the public,the middle and lower-level prevention and control subsystems between the local government and the public,the domestic complete prevention and control system composed of the central government,the local government and the public,and the international joint prevention and control system formed between various countries.The optimal prevention and control strategies under different circumstances are obtained.The main work and conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)In view of the problem of the public’s independent choice in the process of emergency prevention and control of public health emergencies under limited overall circumstances,a stochastic evolutionary game model of public prevention and control is constructed to capture the public’s choice of prevention and control strategies under the normal situation of epidemic.The study finds that the public’s choice of prevention and control strategies with or without prevention and control mainly depends on three factors: random factors,the cost-benefit of different prevention and control strategies,and the number of the public in a certain place.Under the dominance of random factors,the cost and benefit of cooperating with or not cooperating with the prevention and control strategy and the number of the public in a certain place determine the public’s strategy choice.Under the dominance of expected and superexpected benefits,coordinated prevention and control strategies will become an evolutionary stability strategy only when the number of the public is greater than a certain critical value.From the perspective of the evolution process,the government’s punishment measures will slow down the speed of the public choosing not to cooperate with the prevention and control strategy.The speed of the public evolving to the stability strategy under the guidance of overdue expected income is faster than that under the guidance of expected income.(2)In view of the selection of prevention and control strategies for local governments and the public,a stochastic evolutionary game model is constructed with local governments and the public as the main body to study the influence of random disturbance factors on the evolution and stability strategies of local governments and the public.It is found that random interference factors will slow down the evolution of local governments and the public to stable strategies.The local governments evolve to stabilization strategies faster than the public.When the probability of the spread of the epidemic gradually increases,the impact on the change of local government strategy is relatively large,while the impact on the public is relatively small.As the punishment coefficient for local governments and the public gradually increases,local governments and the public are more inclined to choose(active prevention and control,cooperate with prevention and control)strategies,and local governments react more strongly to the punishment.(3)Considering the supervision and guiding role of the central government,a tripartite evolutionary game model of the central government,the local government and the public is constructed,and the selection of prevention and control strategies for the subjects of the tripartite game with the participation of the central government is discussed.It is found that the evolution of the system to the ideal state(strict supervision,active prevention and control,coordinated prevention and control)can be promoted by increasing the social benefits brought by the strict supervision of the central government,increasing the punishment of negative prevention and control of local governments and the punishment of the public for not cooperating with epidemic prevention and control.The selection behavior of each subject is only affected by the value of parameters in the stability conditions,not by the selection probability of each subject.(4)Considering that the joint prevention and control between governments is a long-term continuous process,the differential game method is used to construct an international joint prevention and control system composed of countries with strong and weak epidemic control capabilities.The optimal prevention and control decisions of countries under the conditions of spontaneous governance,external subsidies and internal cost sharing are analyzed.It is found that the optimal prevention and control efforts of countries are negatively correlated with discount rates,prevention and control cost coefficients,decay rate,and risk factors.It is positively correlated with the impact degree of prevention and control efforts on disaster losses,the impact degree of prevention and control efforts on joint prevention and control levels,the proportion of disaster losses,and the impact degree of joint prevention and control efforts on disaster losses.Under the spontaneous governance mode,the prevention and control efforts of both sides and the level of joint prevention and control are the lowest,and external subsidies can improve the prevention and control efforts and reduce disaster losses.On the basis of external subsidies,when the loss distribution meets certain conditions,the joint prevention and control level,disaster losses and system losses under internal cost sharing will be minimized to realize Pareto improvement.The main contribution of this paper is to systematically analyze the game model and strategy selection of multi-agent prevention and control of public health emergencies,and build a multi-level prevention and control system between different subjects.Specifically,the stochastic evolutionary game model of prevention and control among the public and the local government and the public is constructed to form the prevention and control subsystem at the grass-roots level and the prevention and control subsystem at the middle and lower levels.A tripartite evolutionary game model for prevention and control of the central government,local governments and the public has been constructed,forming a complete domestic prevention and control system.The differential game model for joint prevention and control between countries has been constructed,forming an international joint prevention and control system.In short,this paper starts from the internal prevention and control of a single subject,and gradually expands to a domestic prevention and control system involving two or even three parties,until it breaks through the limitation of a single domestic scope and expands to an international joint prevention and control system with a global perspective.The entire multi-agent prevention and control process is progressive and dynamic,forming a rigorous analysis path and a complete analysis chain,which has strong theoretical and practical significance.In particular,it has verified the rationality of China’s current general policy on COVID-19 prevention and control,providing strong support for China’s emergency prevention and control policies at the present stage. |
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