The Research On Promotion Competition Behavior Of China’s Border-Local Government In The Cross-border Sub-regional Cooperation

In the context of peace and development,economic globalization and regional integration have gradually become the trend of world development,and almost all countries have been involved in the wave of internationalization.With the development of local economy in various countries,it has become the mainstream trend of international economic development for different regions to conduct international economic and trade cooperation according to their comparative advantages,and to establish cross-regional cooperation between industries and market economy with complementary advantages.Since the reform and opening up,China has formed an all-round pattern of opening to the outside world,and the economic and social cooperation between border areas and neighboring countries has gradually widened and deepened.The establishment of various cross-border economic cooperation zones has become one of the characteristics of China’s comprehensive opening to the outside world since the 21st century.The "One Belt And One Road" initiative has brought new opportunities for inland and border local governments to participate in cross-border cooperation.However,while the central government encourages local governments to participate in cross-border cooperation,new problems have arisen in the promotion competition among local government officials.Although official promotion incentives can effectively reduce the lazy behavior of government officials,for the local government officials try to develop the local economy,but as a result of the central government(the client)and the local government(agent)there is information asymmetry between the incentive incompatibility issues,make cross-border sub-regional cooperation with local officials to increase efforts to motive the dual goal of not compatible at the same time,forcing local governments to choose domestic market segmentation in the cross-border sub-regional cooperation competition strategy and redundant construction behavior.Therefore,in the context of the "One Belt And One Road"initiative,how to solve the problem of border local governments choosing domestic market segmentation and duplicate construction in cross-border sub-regional cooperation has become the focus of government management and improvement of official promotion mechanism.On this basis,this article takes our country cross-border sub-regional cooperation as the starting point,the regional economics and game theory is introduced into the analysis framework of the frontier,to explore the political competition in participating in cross-border sub-regional cooperation of local government behavior choice of the internal mechanism and behavior difference,and on this basis,to perfect promotion incentive mechanism in our country,in order to eliminate the cross-border sub-regional cooperation and non optimal behavior selection problem of path.Based on the above ideas,this paper analyzes from the following four parts,consisting of nine chapters.The first part is mainly composed of chapters 1～3,which is the literature and theoretical review part.The first chapter introduces the reason,background and research significance of the topic,and introduces the main content,structure and innovation of the paper.Chapter 2 defines the concept and literature review.First of all,the cross-border sub-regional cooperation,the border areas of local government,local governments and promotion competition behavior such as defining the main concepts,think promotion competition behavior of local government effect eventually forms mainly on local government officials of political promotion probability is given by the local government in the central authority,and responsibility within the scope of facing to cope with the local economic and social environment’s behavior choice.Secondly,the literature at home and abroad is sorted out to understand the research status and the latest trends,and the content that needs to be further studied is sorted out.Chapter 3 Theoretical Basis.This paper expounds the basic theoretical knowledge of cross-border sub-regional cooperation and local government political competition behavior,and takes the geo-location theory,promotion competition theory,principal-agent theory and public choice theory as the theoretical support of this paper.The second part is mainly composed of chapter 4～5,which is the part of question raising,hypothesis to be tested and theoretical analysis.Chapter 4 the current situation of China’s border local governments participating in cross-border sub-regional cooperation and the problems existing in the promotion competition behavior of China’s local governments in the process of participation.By combing the current border areas involved in cross-border sub-regional cooperation logic starting point of local government,characteristics and implement process,found in the cross-border sub-regional cooperation of local government in order to win promotion competition,the behavior selection can be induced in the domestic market segmentation and redundant construction problems,in this paper,guided by the two problems put forward two to test the hypothesis.Chapter 5:Theoretical model of promotion competition behavior of border local governments in cross-border sub-regional cooperation.Based on the hypothesis to be tested,a theoretical model analysis framework is constructed to analyze the reasons and motivations for local governments in China’s border regions to choose the domestic single market segmentation strategy or the cross-border sub-regional cooperation in the process of promotion competition.The third part is mainly composed of chapters 6～7,which is the empirical analysis part.Chapter 6 empirical demonstration of local government’s choice of optimal behavior in promotion competition in cross-border sub-regional cooperation.Will China’s border areas when the new contract number,the average of local government as a border area is involved in cross-border sub-regional cooperation instead of variables,the local government officials with border(mayor and party secretary)promotion as the final expression form of promotion competition win,border to participate in the local governments,and were not involved in the change of the cross-border sub-regional cooperation motivation influence on government officials promoted to test hypothesis(1).Chapter 7 empirical demonstration of the promotion competition strategy of the government inclined to egoism in cross-border sub-regional cooperation.On the basis of Chapter 6,it further studies the reasons for the differences in promotion competition behavior,and analyzes the behavioral motives hidden behind the behavior choices of local governments from the perspective of altruism and egoism.Based on theoretical derivation,this paper uses local government officials(mayors and municipal Party secretaries)along the border as the final manifestation of winning promotion competition,and tests the influence of the behavior differences of local government officials with egoism tendencies on the promotion of government officials to test hypothesis(2).The fourth part is mainly composed of chapter 8,which is the optimization path part.Chapter 8 in theory deduction and experience,on the basis of empirical simulation in the process of the cross-border sub-regional cooperation game behavior of local government as well as the analysis path of non-cooperative game dilemma,on this basis,to solve the defects of promotion incentive mechanism for path optimization,the problems of the incentive incompatibility and three kinds of optimization path is put forward.The fifth part mainly consists of Chapter 9,which is the conclusion part.In this paper,four conclusions are drawn:(1)In promotion competition,whether the externalities are positive or negative,the choice of cross-border sub-regional cooperation strategy by local governments along the border is more likely to be promoted than the choice of domestic single market segmentation strategy.From the perspective of empirical evidence,local governments that participate in cross-border sub-regional cooperation are willing to pay more,but the increase of efforts will also increase the probability of their promotion,while the local governments that do not participate in cross-border sub-regional cooperation are willing to pay less,and the reduction of efforts will also reduce the probability of their promotion.(2)Local government officials with altruistic tendencies are more likely to be promoted in the process of promotion competition than those with egoistic tendencies.From the perspective of empirical evidence,the regression results of the total sample support the above view,but there are differences in the regression results of the subsamples.(3)When there is a positive externality,α*=(2-θ)/2 is the solution of the evolutionary stable state.Local governments choose to participate in cross-border sub-regional cooperation as the dominant strategy.When there is a negative externality,α*=1 is the solution of the evolutionary stable state,and the local government chooses the single market segmentation strategy within the territory as the dominant strategy.The numerical simulation further verifies the above conclusion:when there is a positive externality,no matter how much effort the local government’s competitors(local government officials j)choose under the constraint(1/2<β<1),the corresponding effort a of local government officials i can always meet the constraint conditions 1/2<a<1.If there is a negative externality,99.2%of the local government’s effort parameter α values do not meet the constraint conditions 1/2<α<1.(4)The non-cooperative game leads to the path dilemma in the behavior choice of border local governments in cross-border sub-regional cooperation,and finally the segmentation and repeated construction of domestic market becomes the inevitable result of the choice of promotion competition behavior between local governments.Although promotion incentive mechanism can effectively alleviate the above dilemma,when the comparative advantage gap between local regions is large,the incentive model of "competitive competition" will produce the problem of incentive incompatibility,that is,cross-border sub-regional cooperation and the dual goal of local government to increase the motivation of efforts cannot be compatible at the same time.In view of this defect,this paper proposes three optimization approaches of promotion mechanism:promotion incentive model with weighted incentive,promotion mechanism with cooperative alliance under optional contract,and promotionreward dichotomy.In order to reflect the empirical research principle of theoretical analysis of hypotheses to be tested,this paper comprehensively uses the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis,qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis,multidisciplinary comprehensive research methods and comparative research methods.In addition,the possible innovations of this paper are mainly reflected in the following four aspects:(1)The paper try to cross-combine regional economics,game theory and border politics,and study the promotion competition behavior of local governments along the border in cross-border sub-regional cooperation.China’s border areas are the main participants of cross-border sub-regional cooperation.However,under different conditions,whether local governments choose the single market segmentation strategy within the territory or choose cross-border sub-regional cooperation will have different effects on the political promotion of local government officials.By combining regional economics,game theory and frontier politics,and further studying the promotion competition among local governments along the border,it can provide constructive suggestions for the central or superior governments to further manage the local governments.(2)Based on theory and experience,the internal mechanism and behavioral differences of local governments’ choice of promotion competition behavior in cross-border sub-regional cooperation are analyzed.From the perspective of optimal behavior selection motivation,no matter whether the motivation of local government officials is selfish or altruistic,in cross-border sub-regional cooperation,as long as there is a positive level of effort,it is beneficial for local government officials to win the promotion competition in the end,and participation in cross-border sub-regional cooperation is the dominant Nash equilibrium.From the perspective of egoism(otherism)tendency,in the process of promotion competition,local government officials with altruism tendency and egoism tendency are more likely to be promoted than local government officials with egoism tendency in the process of cross-border sub-regional cooperation.(3)Through mathematical deduction,it can be concluded that the promotion incentive mechanism of "competitive competition" will cause the local government to participate in cross-border sub-regional cooperation and increase the motivation of efforts can not be compatible at the same time.Under the central government budget constraint,"tournament" the plight of the incentive mode are incompatible,the local range of intermediate product is comparative advantage,the border area of local government involved in cross-border sub-regional cooperation can bring both promotion competition main body larger economic benefits,but in this condition,the local government in order to develop economy,increase work motivation is close to zero.(4)In non-cooperative game and the path of the predicament of "tournament"incentive mode of incentive incompatibility problems,put forward three kinds of optimization path:weighted incentive promotion incentive mode,optional contract alliance promotion mechanism and promotion-reward dichotomy,the above three kinds of optimization scheme to some extent can effectively circumvent the cross-border sub-regional cooperation in border areas of local government choose domestic market segmentation and redundant construction,further improve the promotion incentives.