Research On The Enterprise Innovation Decision-making Mechanism Based On The Evolution Of High-tech Zones

High-tech zones are an important carrier for China to implement the innovation driven development strategy.Enterprises in the high-tech zones are the vanguard in leading innovation.According to the existing statistical data nearly 40% of the country’s high-tech enterprises gather in the high-tech zones.The R&D investment intensity of enterprises in the high-tech zones is much higher than the national average.Compared with enterprises outside the zone,the innovation competition of enterprises in the high-tech zones is more intense,and enterprises are more seriously affected by policies and cluster environment in the process of innovation.However,there are still deficiencies in the research on the enterprise innovation decision-making process in the theoretical circle,especially the "black box" of the impact of innovation policy on enterprise innovation activities needs to be uncovered.In practice,there are still many puzzles in the implementation of innovation policy.It is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the innovation decision-making behavior of enterprises in national high-tech zones.The paper analyzes the phased characteristics of the evolution of high-tech zones and the typical innovation decision-making behavior of enterprises in different stages.Based on evolutionary game,dynamic game,static game and numerical simulation,the paper constructs a series of enterprise innovation decision-making game models under different scenarios.The paper uses MATLAB software to independently write simulation programs for numerical simulation,visually display the enterprise innovation decision-making process in the form of graphics.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)The development of China’s national high-tech zones has experienced three stages: factor agglomeration,the formation of leading industries and the formation of innovation ecosystem.In each stage,enterprises will face different innovation decision-making problems.In the stage of factor agglomeration,new enterprises actively build their own innovation network in order to obtain more innovation resources.In the formation stage of leading industries,enterprises are facing the problems of R&D competition and cooperation with enterprises in the cluster.In the formation stage of innovation ecosystem,the innovation cooperation behavior among heterogeneous innovation subjects increases,and enterprises need to choose innovation cooperation strategies.(2)Government support,the costs and benefits brought by enterprise network embedding,and the initial willingness of incumbent enterprises to participate all have an impact on the network embedding process and results of start-ups.At the initial stage of networking,the active participation of cluster incumbent enterprises is more conducive to the successful embedding of new enterprises into the network than government support;In the later stage of networking,the government can gradually withdraw its support for enterprise networking.(3)The R&D decision-making process of enterprises is affected by many factors,such as policy environment,cluster environment,technology spillover,R&D cooperation mode and so on.In order to maximize profits,enterprises should choose different R&D cooperation modes in different situations.In order to maximize social welfare,the government should implement differentiated R&D subsidy strategies for different clusters.Firstly,enterprises in the same supply chain should adopt the R&D consortium mode,so that the R&D investment and profit of enterprises can be maximized.The government should give priority to the subsidy strategy of innovation investment,encourage supply chain enterprises to form R&D consortia and improve technology spillovers.Secondly,for competitive enterprises that produce homogeneous products,if they have equal strength,they should choose to form R&D consortium,then choose R&D coordination and technology sharing alliance,and finally choose R&D competition.If there is a great difference in strength between enterprises,leading enterprises should choose R&D coordination and low technology spillover,and following enterprises should choose R&D competition and high technology spillover.When the government subsidizes the cluster enterprises in the leading-driven cluster,it should give priority to the innovation investment subsidy.When subsidizing the enterprises composed of competitors with similar strength,various subsidy methods can promote the enterprise R&D investment and improve the social welfare.(4)In the process of the industry-university-institute cooperation,the choice of cooperation strategy among enterprises,sci-tech commissioners and university research institutions is affected by the cooperation cost,income,government support and government support objects.At the same time,the choice of cooperation behavior of all participants affects each other.Establishing a reasonable benefit distribution mechanism is the key to promote the formation of the industry-university-institute cooperation and ensure the effective operation of sci-tech commissioner system.Compared with the government rewarding science and technology commissioners,government subsidized enterprises can more effectively promote all participants to actively participate in industry university research cooperation.Based on the analysis of the shortcomings of existing research,the paper constructs a series of enterprise innovation decision-making models and tries to achieve breakthroughs and innovations in research methods and research contents.The innovations are as follows:(1)The innovations in research methods.Different from the quantitative analysis methods such as multivariate statistics and traditional game theory method,the paper systematically adopts the frontier research methods such as evolutionary game theory derived from biology and simulation methods derived from computer science.On the one hand,the evolutionary game theory is adopted to dynamically describe the interaction behavior of relevant game participants in the network embedding process of new high-tech enterprise clusters and the formation mechanism of industry-university-institute cooperation under the sci-tech commissioner system.On the other hand,the simulation program is independently written by Matlab software for numerical simulation to cross verify the theoretical derivation results and intuitively show the strategy selection process of each game participant.(2)The innovation in research content.(1)From the perspective of dynamic evolution,this paper studies the network embedding process of new high-tech enterprise clusters,and expands the relevant research on enterprise network embedding behavior.Different from the existing research on the impact of network embedding results on enterprise innovation activities and innovation performance from a static perspective,the paper will help to uncover the "black box" of enterprise network embedding process by analyzing the action response of cluster incumbent enterprises in the process of network embedding and the impact of government support on Network Embedding speed and embedding results.(2)The decision-making behavior of enterprise R&D investment under the comprehensive action of multiple R&D factors enriches the research on enterprise R&D decision-making..Different from the existing research that the influencing factors of R&D decision are relatively single,the paper constructs enterprise R&D decision models for different cluster types of high-tech zones.Considering the impact of R&D subsidy strategy,technology spillover,R&D mode,R&D difficulty,enterprise manufacturing efficiency and other factors on enterprise R&D decision-making,the model is closer to reality and more general.(3)The paper analyzes the formation mechanism of the industry-university-institute cooperation innovation under the sci-tech commissioner system from the perspective of dynamic evolution,which further expands the depth and breadth of the research on industry-university-institute behavior.The existing literature is lack of research on sci-tech commissioner system.The paper establishes two kinds of evolutionary game models when the government subsidizes enterprises and the government rewards science and technology commissioners,analyzes the impact of key factors on the choice of cooperation behavior of participants,and further verifies the research conclusion through case analysis.