Urban Employee Pension Payment Risk,Double Balance Constraint And Risk Avoidance Mechanism

General Secretary Xi Jinping,in the twenty-eighth collective learning of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in February 26,2021,stressed that "we should enhance risk awareness and identify future trends in China’s aging population and average life expectancy,so as to enhance foreseeability and initiative at work." This paper foresees the potential risks and manifest possibilities of pension payment risk under the trend of prolonging the life expectancy of the population,and enhances the foresight of the dynamic changes in the pension benefits during the retirement period.It is a forward-looking study on improving the livelihood welfare level and improving the pension system,and also a theoretical response to the General Secretary Xi Jinping’s livelihood thought.With the gradual increase of life expectancy,the pension payment duration of the insured has been significantly extended,and the possibility of manifesting the pension payment risk in the retirement period has increased.How to determine the pension payment risk,what measures can be taken to effectively avoid the pension payment risk,what factors restrict the risk aversion policy,and whether the risk policy setting is reasonable are of great significance.The logical relationship of hierarchy progression is also the research focus of pension payment risk aversion.This paper innovatively constructs the judgment standard and mathematical model of pension payment risk,measures the level and explicit possibility of pension payment risk coefficient under the trend of life expectancy extension.The pension payment risk coefficient for male employees corresponding to the minimum contribution standard has increased from 0.52 to 0.79,the risk is obvious.The pension payment risk coefficient for female employees corresponding to the minimum contribution standard has increased from 0.58 to1.44,they will be facing the dilemma of pension security.The paper takes the actuarial balance and fund balance of pension insurance as constraints,puts forward the reasonable boundary of realistic and potential policy tools for pension payment risk aversion.In the case of not delaying the retirement age,it is better to adopt the linkage between the calculation coefficient and the adjustment index of 5%,and increase the minimum contribution year standard to 17 years.In the case of delaying the retirement age,it is better to increase the pension adjustment index to 6%.The paper analyzes the impact of external economic fluctuations and endogenous parameters on the demand for risk aversion and the implementation of policy tools.This paper reconsiders the policy tool boundary of pension pension risk,and sets the final optimal policy combination of pension pension risk aversion as the minimum contribution standard is increased to 20 years,the pension adjustment index is set as the social average wage growth rate of 65%,and the individual account calculation coefficient,pension adjustment index and life expectancy are adjusted together.Further,the economic effect of risk aversion of pension payment is tested by econometrics to determine the rationality of risk aversion mechanism.The specific research contents and structure of this paper are as follows:The first chapter is the introduction.This chapter expounds the realistic background and research significance of pension payment risk aversion,combs the domestic and foreign research on pension security function,pension sustainability and the relationship between pension insurance and economic development,refines the research methods and ideas of pension payment risk aversion,and expounds the main innovation and shortcomings of this paper.The second chapter is the theoretical analysis of pension payment risk aversion.This chapter defines the connotation of the relevant concepts of pension payment risk,analyzes the theoretical basis of overlapping generations model,pension life cycle and pension moderate level,and combs the logical evolution framework of pension payment risk aversion,so as to provide theoretical basis for the measurement and response of pension payment risk.The third chapter is the present situation of pension payment level of urban employees and the impact of longevity risk.This chapter quantificationally measures the current situation of pension payment level of urban employees and the heterogeneity of payment level of the differences between regions and insurance options,analyzes the impact of life expectancy extension on pension payment level,and judges the development trend of pension payment level based on the actual data,so as to provide the basis for determining the possible pension payment risks in the future.The fourth chapter is the pension payment risk measurement and policy response.This chapter focuses on the construction of the pension social average wage replacement rate and pension payment risk coefficient model in the retirement period,and measures the pension security risk of different participants and different insurance options.At the same time,it analyzes the realistic response of the current pension adjustment index policy to the security risk,as well as the impact of potential risk aversion policy tools such as the minimum payment period standard,delayed retirement age and individual account calculation coefficient on the pension payment risk.The fifth chapter is the double balance constraint of pension payment risk aversion.The boundary setting of policy tools for risk aversion of pension payment will be constrained by actuarial balance and fund balance of pension insurance.Risk aversion of pension payment can not be at the cost of pension unsustainability.This chapter focuses on the possibility of achieving the goal of risk aversion of pension payment under the constraints of pension sustainability of double balance,and tests the realization of Pareto improvement that realizing pension payment risk aversion and pension sustainable development synchronously.The sixth chapter is risk aversion policy,external shock and endogenous incentive.Based on the impact of external economic shocks and endogenous incentives on pension payment risk aversion,this chapter reconsiders the boundary setting of risk aversion policy tools,uses VAR model to test the impact of exogenous shocks on the demand for risk aversion and the possibility of policy implementation,and uses BP neural network and random forest model to test the impact of endogenous incentives on the optimization of risk aversion policy.Finally,the optimal policy combination of pension payment risk aversion is determined.The seventh chapter is the economic effect test of pension payment risk aversion.This chapter focuses on the analysis of the impact of pension payment risk aversion on consumption,human capital investment,employment and other economic development factors,studies the relationship between pension payment risk aversion and economic development,and judges whether the design of risk aversion policy has economic rationality.The eighth chapter is the research conclusions and countermeasures of pension payment risk aversion.This chapter combs the conclusions of pension payment risk measurement,the possibility of potential risk manifesting,risk aversion policy design and its economic effect under double balance constraints,and puts forward countermeasures and suggestions for pension payment risk aversion from the aspects of risk aversion implementation path,improving endogenous incentive and reasonably coping with external shocks.