An Analysis Of Consumer Referral Behavior And Market Equilibrium In Social E-commerce

Under the strategic goal of building a large domestic economic cycle,the development quality of social e-commerce in China needs to be improved.The main reason for the low development quality of social e-commerce in China is that the natural advantages of social e-commerce cannot play a role due to the improper design of sales mode,such as efficient dissemination of information and improving consumers’ additional utility.The lack of research on social e-commerce system makes it difficult for retailers to obtain effective theoretical support for their sales model design.Based on this,this paper takes the three most important social e-commerce sales models,referral reward model,online group buying model and online crowdfunding model as the research objects.And,this paper systematically analyzes the consumer referral behavior and the equilibrium of market in the three sales models,which not only improves the theoretical research of social e-commerce,but also provides theoretical basis and policy guidance for the optimal mode design of social e-commerce under different sales models.Based on the above problems and research objectives,this paper focuses on the consumer referral behavior in social networks,and based on the development status and specific problems of social e-commerce in China,this paper analyzes the main characteristics of three sales models,and then constructs a dynamic Stackelberg game model of retail retailer,existing consumer and potential consumer according to the main characteristics of different models the influence mechanism and market equilibrium of consumer referral behavior under three sales models.The specific contents and results are as follows:In order to clarify the development and problems of social e-commerce in China,Chapter 3 of this paper collects the relevant development data of three models of social e-commerce in recent years(referral reward model,online group buying model and online crowdfunding model),and explores the development and problems of social ecommerce in China through descriptive analysis.The results show that: the development quality of social e-commerce in China is low,low price competition is serious,the essential reason is that the retailer’s sales model is not designed properly.On this basis,this paper comparatively analyzes and summarizes the main characteristics of the three sales models,which provides a solid practical foundation for the following research.In order to solve the problem of retailer’s optimal sales model design in the referral reward model,based on the analysis results of the problems and mode characteristics in Chapter 3,Chapter 4 introduces the interaction of social network structure,network externality and referral cost into the referral reward model for the first time.By constructing the dynamic Stackelberg game model of "retailer-recommender-receiver",this paper analyzed the threshold push model the influence mechanism and market equilibrium of consumer’s referral behavior under referral reward mode and threshold free referral reward mode find the optimal reward size and distribution model for retailers.The results show that the network externality of social network has a significant positive impact on the recommender’s referral and the acceptor’s acceptance behavior,while the impact of referral cost is negative.Considering the network externality,only when the network externality is much higher than the referral cost,the performance of the threshold referral reward mode is higher than that of the nonthreshold model.Otherwise,the threshold not only cannot play an inducing role,but also hinder consumers’ referral.Therefore,in general,the profit of retailers using the threshold referral reward mode is more robust.In order to further solve the problem of optimal sales mode design of retailers under the more complex online group buying model.The Chapter 5 refers to the construction method of referral reward mode model,take the online group buying model with threshold as the research object for the first time,and comprehensively consider the interaction of external factors such as social network structure and group buying threshold,and construct the group buying model which based on the dynamic Stackelberg game model of "retailer-focal consumer-common consumer",this paper analyzes the consumer referral behavior,the influence mechanism and the market equilibrium under the interaction,so as to find the optimal design method of online group buying mode for retailers.The results show that group buying threshold has significant induction effect,but when the product price is low and the network externality is greater than the referral cost,the induction effect is invalid.Interestingly,network externality,referral cost and product price have a significant impact on the design of group buying threshold.When the referral cost is similar to the network externality,the higher the referral cost is,the higher the product price of the retailer is.On the contrary,the group buying threshold of the retailer should be set higher.In addition,monopoly retailers should not adopt the form of lower price promotion under the group buying mode.Even when the referral cost is much higher than the network externality,the retailer’s product pricing cannot be lower than the optimal pricing of general retail.Moreover,in order to solve the problem of optimal sales model design in the most complex network crowdfunding model,the project success rate is introduced into the model construction for the first time in Chapter 6.Considering the interaction of external factors such as random arrival of consumers,network structure and project success rate,the model is constructed the dynamic Stackelberg game model of "retailer","leader" and "follower" is used to analyze the consumer referral behavior and market equilibrium in the network crowdfunding mode,and find the optimal design method of network crowdfunding mode for retailers.The results show that consumers’ referral behavior is affected by the number of current supporters.When the number of current supporters is too small,consumers will not choose to recommend.When the number of supporters of the project is small,the financing threshold can improve consumers’ willingness to recommend,which means that the financing threshold also has its inducing effect in the network crowdfunding mode.Retailers can’t set the threshold too low when they set the threshold.The low threshold will reduce the early consumers’ referral willingness.Moreover,the setting of financing threshold cannot guide the late leader of the project to support and recommend,but can only play an inducing role in the initial stage of the project.To sum up,this paper systematically analyzes the consumer referral behavior and market equilibrium in social e-commerce under the background of social network for the first time,and introduces the important characteristics of social network,such as social network structure,network externality and referral cost,into the referral reward model,online group buying model and online crowdfunding model.And the dynamic Stackelberg game model of retailer,existing consumer and potential consumer is constructed,which is also a great contribution of this paper in the theoretical research.With the help of model analysis and theoretical derivation,this paper explores the optimization design of the current social e-commerce model in China,which provides effective theoretical guidance for the retailer’s sales model design and beneficial policy suggestions for improving the development of social e-commerce.