Research On Optimization Of Operation Strategies In The On-demand Service Platform

The explosive development of the economy and advance of information technology have promoted the emergence and rapid growth of on-demand service platforms with the characteristics of the two-sided markets.These platforms do not own the resources and only match idle service providers for demanders via mobile devices,and then extract commissions from the finished services.Independent service providers can also enjoy flexible working hours.The above features make on-demand service platforms achieve economies of scale and expansion.However,a series of problems related to operation strategies appear behind the rise of on-demand services,which affect the decision-making behavior of stakeholders.Although some scholars have made some achievements in the field of the on-demand economy,some gaps have not been noticed and solved.Therefore,this thesis uses game theory,contract theory,prospect theory,and other theoretical methods to study the optimization of operation strategies in the ondemand service platform.Specifically,in the information disclosure strategy,this thesis studies the choices of different sharing models for demanders' destination information,and information sharing among members and collusion caused by information leakage.In the pricing strategy,this thesis analyzes the different pricing strategies adopted by the platform in the different peak periods and the impact of the decision maker with reference-dependent preference on the platform capacity management.The main results are as follows:For the different destination information models in on-demand service platforms,Chapter 3 studies the impacts of the model choices on the optimal decision-making and profits of the stakeholders.The main results show that in the supply-demand matching setting,the ex-post destination information model generates more revenues for the platform than the ex-ante destination information model in most cases.When both the opportunity cost and subsidy are lower or the subsidy is higher,the service providers can be worse off under the ex-post destination information model.The exante destination information model generates more demander surplus than the ex-post destination information model.The research of this chapter can provide some thoughts for the decision-making of platform enterprises and the choices of different platforms by participants.For collusion between on-demand service platforms,Chapter 4 analyzes the impacts of different collusion types—explicit and tacit collusion—on information sharing among members,pricing strategy,and service provider's revenue.The main results show that the explicit collusion will completely inhibit information sharing because information sharing is always conducive to the service provider and hurts platforms.The tacit collusion can partially discourage the platforms from sharing information only if the effort cannot accurately deliver the service provider's information to platforms since information sharing is always beneficial to the service provider and not always advantageous to the collusive platforms.The purpose of this chapter is to provide some insights for the policy-making of antitrust agencies.For the differential pricing set by the on-demand service platform in the different peak periods,Chapter 5 investigates the effects of the multiplier-based and uniform pricing schemes on the optimal decision-making of each stakeholder and the feasible region of each pricing scheme.The main results show that the non-peak price in the multiplier-based pricing scheme is lower than the price in the uniform pricing scheme.The multiplier-based pricing scheme does not always generate more profits than the uniform pricing scheme for the platform in some decision spaces,which depends on the proportion of non-peak periods in one day.Moreover,the uniform pricing scheme needs more staff capacities than the multiplier-based pricing scheme because the price cannot be changed based on the peak periods.The research in this chapter not only provides the basis for the choice of enterprise operation strategy,but also gives some suggestions to participants.By using the prospect theory,Chapter 6 systematically explains the decision biases since the optimal decisions under uncertainty always deviate from the normative decisions in the decision maker of the on-demand service platform,and analyzes the impacts of the platform with reference-dependent preference on the adequate capacity pool of eligible agents and optimal pricing strategy.The main results show that the scenario with reference-dependent preferences affects the capacity pool of platform and the eligible service provider's revenue,where the subsidy and commission ratios play important roles.The platform considering reference payoff into the decision objective is worse off in profits.The results of this chapter can help on-demand service platforms design the subsidy and price strategies in the risks setting.