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An Analysis Of The Impact On Cross-shareholding Enterprises Equilibrium Strategies

Posted on:2022-02-26Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y X LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1489306314456514Subject:Industrial Economics
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As socialism with Chinese characteristics enters a new era and China’s economic development enters a new normal,it is imperative to establish a state-owned capital allocation adapted to the new stage of development,improve the operating efficiency of state-owned capital,and achieve high-quality economic development in China.High-quality economic development requires a more rational allocation of resources and a more optimized economic structure.From the perspective of management,capital management with focus on capital operation is the most efficient way to appreciate and preserve the value of assets.The process of capital operation,in fact,is the process of capital appreciation through the purposeful movement of capital and changes in the rules of capital form.Optimizing the structure of stock capital is an important part of the capital management process in order to transform capital from stagnation to movement and achieve optimal allocation according to market changes.The reform of state-owned enterprises in China has taken the separation of government and enterprises as the main task from the very beginning.Years of reform practice has proven that the key to reform is to build a property rights foundation that can realize the separation of government and enterprises.From the trend of global economic development,relying on the union and concentration of capital to improve market competitiveness has become a world trend.Breaking the restrictions of regions,industries,sectors and even ownership,and aggregating the scattered funds of the whole society in accordance with the principle of market efficiency to realize the optimal allocation of all factors of production is a key factor for the sustained and steady development of the national economy.In recent years,China is promoting the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in an orderly manner,from the perspective of capital operation,mixed ownership has broken through the boundaries of public and private ownership,regardless of whether the source of capital is public or private,has been integrated into the corporate property of enterprises,the various subjects of interest through the optimization of the governance structure is forming a hybrid,complex property rights arrangements.At the same time,the shareholding structure of modern enterprises is becoming more and more complex,the behavior of cross-shareholding among enterprises is becoming more common,and the mode of capital operation is becoming more variable and unstable,based on this,this paper conducts theoretical and empirical research from the perspective of cross-shareholding and mutual integration of state-owned capital,collective capital and non-public capital.Based on the classical Cournot competition model,as well as the production cost structure,profit function,management philosophy and corporate culture,this paper uses incomplete or asymmetric information game model to analyze output,price and profit from static and dynamic perspectives.By using repetitive game theory and methods,this paper mainly focuses on the game of competition of oligopolistic firms,and extends the classical Cournot model to analyze the influence of cross-holding on the competitive behavior of firms from multiple perspectives and levels.From the perspective of game theory methodology,the Cournot competition model and Bayesian dynamic game model of dual oligopoly market are constructed,and the influence of cross-shareholding on the competitive equilibrium strategy choice of enterprises is analyzed.It then analyzes the theoretical mechanism of effective market risk avoidance by cross-shareholding,discusses the theoretical mechanism of different types of partner selection on market risk,empirically studies the risk avoidance effect of cross-shareholding and its influence path,and combs the main work and research conclusions in this paper.This paper consists of six chapters,the main points of each chapter are as follows Chapter 1 is the Introduction,which introduces the background and significance of the study,the research ideas and methods,the research framework and content,and the main innovations and shortcomings of the study.Chapter 2 is a literature review and related theories,in the literature review section mainly introduces the progress of game equilibrium research under asymmetric and symmetric information conditions,the progress of research on competitive behavior among cross-holding firms and the progress of research on partner selection strategy;in the related theories section mainly introduces the Nash equilibrium in the game,the theory of information structure and information asymmetry,cross-holding and mixed ownership reform,the Cournot model in oligopoly market and the Bertrand oligopoly model.Chapter 3 is a game analysis of share cross-holding firms on the equilibrium strategy,including static and dynamic game analysis.In the static analysis,the Cournot competition model is used to analyze the cross-holding strategy in the dual oligopoly market environment.In the dynamic analysis,the Bayesian game is used to perform the equilibrium output analysis and the equilibrium return analysis under the cross-holding of dual oligopolies,which gives the Bayes-Nash equilibrium for the competitive firms of oligopolies.Chapter 4 is the analysis of the influences of cross-holding,including the selection of risk influences of cross-holding based on the game model and the empirical analysis of the risk influences of cross-holding.In the empirical analysis,the data acquisition and variables are explained,and then the risk analysis of cross-holding is performed by developing a model that contains a number of indicators of the two firms.Chapter 5 analyzes the risk-avoidance effect of cross-holding partner selection strategy,including the risk-avoidance effect of cross-holding partner enterprise type selection,the risk-avoidance effect of cross-holding partner enterprise size selection and the risk-avoidance effect of cross-holding partner enterprise industry nature selection.Chapter 6 is the summary and outlook.It mainly summarizes the strategy selection,risk influencing factors analysis and partner selection strategy analysis of enterprises under cross-holding,looks forward to the key contents of the next research and identifies the future research direction.In summary,the study reached the following main conclusions:First,the oligopolists obtain the same Cournot equilibrium output in both cases without and with cross-holdings,and this consistency can be seen as the cross-holdings change the demand function of both parties,leading to a decrease in the influence of changes in their own output on the price of their own products,but no change in the influence on the price of their competitors’ products.Second,the assumption of cross-shareholding in Bayesian Cournot competition can be implemented by changing the parameters in the demand function and,under certain equivalence assumptions,can be seen from the results of Bayesian Cournot competition,where cross-shareholding does not change the influence of changes in one’s own output on the price of one’s own product,but has a greater influence on the price of competitors’ products.It is found through Bayes-Nash equilibrium that cross-holding changes the incentives for firms to share information in a given situation.Thirdly,the volatility of the listed enterprise’s own shares after participating in cross-shareholding is not only affected by the scale of cross-shareholding investment,but also by the operating conditions of the cooperating enterprises,which has a significant risk-avoidance effect,irrespective of whether it is a shareholder or being held.Fourth,the scale of cross-shareholding investment has a significant negative impact on the joint volatility of the cooperating enterprises,and the cooperating parties can reduce the overall risk through cross-shareholding.Fifth,the selection of cross-holding partners affects the joint volatility of cross-holding firms,with different mechanisms for different types of firms.If both the shareholder and the cross-holding partner are state-owned enterprises,the joint volatility will be reduced,but it will not affect the risk aversion effect of the investment scale;if the shareholder is a large enterprise,the enterprise portfolio will have a stronger joint risk aversion effect,and the cross-holding partner,while affecting the joint volatility,will also have a certain regulating effect on the risk aversion effect of the investment scale,but it will not change the risk of the investment scale;if the cross-holding partner is a large enterprise,the enterprise portfolio will have a stronger joint risk aversion effect.Avoidance effect;if the cross-holding firms belong to the same industry,there will be a negative effect on joint volatility as well as a moderating effect on the risk aversion effect of investment size,but it will not change the risk aversion effect of investment size.Based on the above researchings and conclusions,the following insights were obtained in this paper:First,for the deterministic model,cross-shareholding actually(and arguably)changes the demand function of both firms,thus affecting their final equilibrium output;for the uncertainty model,the incentive to share information changes when faced with the same strategy(action)by a competitor,i.e.,the introduction of cross-ownership makes the strategy "information sharing" is no longer the optimal "reacting strategy"under certain conditions.Second,firms can avoid risk through cross-shareholding cooperation,and the final effect depends on the size of investment between firms and the types of firms on both sides of the cooperation.The reputational signaling of SOEs can enable SOEs with cross-shareholdings to significantly reduce stock volatility and reduce their own risk-taking,independent of investment size.Third,in the context of mixed ownership reform,non-SOEs choose to hold shares in SOEs without affecting their own productivity,while at the same time reducing their own risk through the reputation signal of SOEs,which to some extent improves the efficiency of resource allocation.Fourth,cross-shareholding can complement the cooperation of enterprises in the same industry,weaken the competition between enterprises,and create a win-win situation for both sides.It is important to guard against monopolistic phenomena and to control cross-shareholdings that do lead to market concentration and are not conducive to consumer welfare.
Keywords/Search Tags:Cross-shareholding, Cournot model, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, Risk aversion effect, Partner selection
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