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The Economic Consequence Resarch Of Institutional Investor Network Clique

Posted on:2020-01-15Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:X D GuoFull Text:PDF
GTID:1489305741964419Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,the cross-research of social network and finance has become a research hotspot,a large number of scholars in the field of finance have been trying to use the theories and methods of social networks to study the existing problems in the field.Despite fruitful achievements,no literature has studied the economic consequences of institutional investor network clique in China’s capital market by referring to the social network method,and the literatures concerning its influence on information efficiency,stock price crash risk and enterprise innovation are almost blank.In addition,in real economic activity,it is common that institutional investors bunch together for warming up each other.However,when institutional investors bunch together,accompanied by the bunching is that,the stock prices of their holding shares have skyrocketed and plummeted,and even caused the ups and downs of the stock market and "stampede tragedy" frequent occurrence.Moreover,in China’s capital market,it is quite common for institutional investors to bunch together to hype innovative concept stocks.In the whole process of hyping,their bunching together plays an important role.Whenever in pre-hype layout,taking advantage of the situation to hype,or research and do homework after the hype cools down,institutional investors’bunching together can always be seenDespite the observed harm to the stock market caused by the institutional investor network clique in reality,as well as the Chinese people’s introspection on the lack of independent innovation ability of Chinese enterprises,few literatures explore the economic consequences and their mechanism of institutional investor network clique in China’s capital market from the perspective of information efficiency,stock price crash risk and enterprise innovation.Moreover,the existing research basically inferred the mechanism of institutional investors’ influence on information efficiency,stock price crash risk and enterprise innovation from the relationship between the overall shareholding and trading behaviors of institutional investors or different types of institutional investors and them,few literatures consider the interaction between members of the institutional investor group.In addition,there is almost no literature on the impact of institutional investor network clique on information efficiency,stock price crash risk and enterprise innovation.In view of this,this paper uses social network method to extract institutional investor network clique,to explore the influence mechanism of institutional investor network clique on information efficiency of stock market,stock price crash risk and enterprise innovation,and to try to fill the existing research gaps,the conclusions are as follows:First,by reducing competition among members of the institutional investor community and the degree to which they engage in aggressive trading,institutional investor network clique can prevent the integration of private information of institutional investor clique members into the stock price,therefore,slow down the speed of their private information integrating into stock price and reduce stock information content.Through the group action of institutional investors-the same in and out of a certain stock,drive stock price bubble to expand,increase the sensitivity of stock price to trading volume change,increase corporate idiosyncratic risk,so as to reduce the information efficiency of the stock market.Second,in addition to delaying the infusing of information into the stock price,increasing the possibility and degree of negative information being hidden,accumulated and released centrally and the opacity of company information,institutional investor network clique increase the stock price crash risk afterwards by reducing the governance effect of the overall "exit threat" of the institutional investors clique,which can weaken their oversight effcet on corporate management’s hiding bad news,and by driving the stock price bubble,and collectively escaping to smash the plate.Third,agency costs and differences in investor protection level have a significant moderating effect on the impact of institutional investor network clique on the company’s stock price crash risk.The moderating effect of property right nature is not obvious.Compared with other enterprises,in enterprises with high agency costs and enterprises in areas with high investor protection level,institutional investor network clique plays a more significant role in exacerbating the risk of stock price crash.Fourth,in China’s capital market,due to the low shareholding ratio of individual institutional investor,institutional investor tends to focus on short-term speculation and lack sufficient ability and motivation to supervise the company’s innovation activities.This makes the power of the clique,which individual institutional investors to gather and form through network connection,still relatively weak.This makes them unable to compete with the actual controller of the company,unable to supervise the management of the company.Institutional investors are more likely to buching together to hype the concept of innovation,thus prompting the company to increase the number of short-term patent applications and R&D ratio,improve short-term performance and company value.And,it has no material impact on the actual innovation ability of enterprises,long-term performance and corporate value.Compared with the existing research,the contribution and innovation of this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects:Firstly,from the perspective of information efficiency,this paper studies the influence of institutional investor clique on the behaviors of institutional investors,and enriches and expands relevant studies on the adverse economic consequences caused by institutional investor network clique.Although existing literatures have explored the consequences of institutional investor clique in corporate governance,their research does not involve the information efficiency of the stock market.This paper studies the impact of institutional investor network clique on the information efficiency of the stock market,which enriches and expands this research.Secondly,it is the first time to study the influencial mechanism of the network clique on the stock price crash risk,which based on the institutional investor interaction.The economic interpretation mechanism is constructed from the dimensions of stock price information efficiency and corporate governance,which provides a new theoretical explanation for the influence of institutional investor network clique on stock price crash risk,and enriches and improves relevant researches on the economic consequences caused by the network structure and its characteristics.Although there have been studies on the impact of institutional investor network on the risk of stock price crash,and have explored the effect of individual network location on the risk of stock price crash according to the self-interest motivation of individual network location on their information mining and transmission ability.However,existing literatures mainly focus on the difference of network location at the individual level,such as the application of network centrality in the disciplines of economics and management.This paper,for the first time,focuses on the interaction between individuals within the network,and takes the network clique as the unit to explore the overall impact of the group on listed companies,which fills the gap in domestic research on network clique for institutional investors.Thirdly,combined with China’s unique institutional background,it provides China’s empirical evidence for the role played by institutional investors in the process of corporate governance,and supplements and improves relevant studies on the role played by institutional investors in corporate governance.The study found that institutional investor network clique weakened the governance effectiveness of their"exit threats",but did not enhance the governance effectiveness of "their voices",which was slightly different from the existing literature findings in the US capital market,and could provide unique policy guidance for Chinese institutional investors’ transaction behavior regulation.Fourthly,it is the first time to explore the impact of institutional investors on enterprise innovation from the perspective of network clique,so as to enrich and deepen the research on the mechanism of institutional investors’ influence on enterprise innovation.The existing studies mainly empirically test the relationship between institutional investors as a whole and the shareholding ratio of one or several different types of institutional investors and corporate innovation to infer the mechanism of institutional investors’ influence on corporate innovation,lack of consideration of the mutual relation and influence among them.Based on this,this paper deeply analyzes the mechanism of institutional investors’ influence on enterprise innovation from the perspective of network clique,enriches and improves the research on the mechanism of institutional investors’ influence on enterprise innovation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Institutional Investor, Network Clique, Information Efficiency, Stock Price Crash Risk, Enterprise Innovation
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