Research On Judges’ Adverse Selection

The judges have the power to make the final decision.The purpose of the judges is to defend fairness and justice through the actions of “rational people” such as selection and choice.The individual and collective actions of judges can not only reflect the “nature of the judicial process”,but can also be used to “measure the judicial process”.At present,the theoretical research and practical cognition of judges on individual and collective behaviors are relatively insufficient.The most serious problems include the lack of micro-foundational research on judicial efficiency,presupposition of judges’ actions as judicial constants in the design of the mechanism,and underestimation of the value of “judge’s incentive mechanism”to judicial justice.This research uses the basic principles of information economics to make an in-depth analysis of the judges’ adjudication process,and attempts to prove that judges rely on their information advantages to always influence the outcome of justice.This information advantage is the objective result of the professional characteristics of judges.At the same time,the maintenance of this information advantage is accompanied by judicial costs and efficiency losses that cannot be ignored.This research has conducted in-depth studies and effective demonstrations of judges’ adverse selection behavior from two dimensions of “case trial” and “case supervision”,establishes multiple economic theory models for the phenomena of “not sentenced to divorce” in the first divorce dispute case and the escape from the "formal" case supervision in the court bureaucracy,and analyzes the various negative effects of judges’ adverse selection on judicial efficiency and justice.This research summarizes the common characteristics of different judges’ adverse selection behaviors through static comparative analysis,and initially proves the principle that judges’ adverse selection behaviors are grafted in the judicial mechanism and amplify negative effects through dynamic connection analysis.In order to overcome the negative effects of the adverse selection behavior of judges,this research emphasizes the full use of the two mechanisms of“information for judges” and “information sent by judges”.In addition,it also proposes to optimize the methods of judicial quality assessment,the functions of judge hierarchy,the judge’s credit system,the norms for handling similar cases,the methods for homogenizing judicial products,the judge punishment and occupational security systems.This research can be divided into six parts:Part I: This research reviews the theoretical research results on judicial efficiency,and points out that the current value of efficiency is mainly reflected in the case handling cycle and pure quantity,but not reflected in the judges’ choice of resource allocation and the judges’ behavior incentive mechanism.In this context,although information economics and adverse selection theory,which reflects the most important research results of economics in the past half century,are being extended to the judicial field,the problems of its application include insufficient focus on core issues and insufficient theoretical demonstration.At present,China’s various theories of behavior of judges adhere to their “so-called methods and fields”,which has limitations such as narrow scope,poor methods and insufficient openness.Part II: This study uses an empirical method to analyze the current expression of judicial efficiency.It is found that there is a major flaw in this expression in regard to judge behavior as an invariant constant.Judicial efficiency evaluation should not ignore the precise meaning of micro-study,and should analyze the judicial efficiency based on individual judges.It is believed that the research of individual judge behavior from the perspective of information has a sufficient theoretical basis of law and economics.It proves that the essence of judges’ behavior is to use information resources to generate alternative rights allocation patterns.It is found that there are large differences and uncertainties in the choice of information resources by individual judges.In addition,on the one hand,the information advantage of individual judges strengthens judicial judgment and persuasion;on the other hand,existing judicial knowledge and cognition ignore the cost of information asymmetry.Part III: By studying the phenomenon of “not sentenced to divorce” in 600 first divorce disputes,this research finds that due to the information superiority of the judges and the information disadvantages of the litigants,both parties’ fundamental expectations of the system have changed.This makes the first divorce disputes lack pleading value and substantive significance.By constructing different models under discontinuous and continuous uniform conditions,the derivation proves that there is an adverse selection behavior caused by information asymmetry between judges and litigants.After analyzing the three types of extensions of the basic model,it summarizes the negative effects caused by the judges’ adverse selection behavior in the first divorce dispute.Part IV: By studying the phenomenon of escaping the “formal” case supervision in the bureaucracy of the court,this research finds that due to the information superiority of the judges and the information disadvantages of the presidents,both parties’ fundamental expectations of the system have changed.As a result,difficult cases in judicial practice are difficult to enter into the “formal” case supervision process,at which time the power restriction function fails.By constructing different models under discontinuous and continuous uniform conditions,it is deduced that there is an adverse selection behavior caused by information asymmetry between the judge and the president.After analyzing the three types of expansion of the basic model,it also summarizes the negative effects caused by the judges’ adverse selection behavior in case supervision.Part V: This research summarizes the common characteristics of different judges’ adverse selection behaviors through static comparative analysis,and initially proves the principle that judges’ adverse selection behaviors are grafted in the judicial mechanism and amplify negative effects through dynamic connection analysis.This research also proves that although any one person in judicial activity belongs to an independent role collective,any one person will never try to improve the collective dilemma aside from individual interests.In addition,it also proposes to optimize the methods of judicial quality assessment,the functions of judge hierarchy,the judges’ credit system,the norms for handling similar cases,the methods for homogenizing judicial products,the judge punishment and occupational security systems.Part VI: In the conclusion section,the new viewpoints and new findings in the first five parts are sorted out.On this basis,the research refines the final conclusions and reflects on the shortcomings.