| Nowadays,China has gained economic supernormal development and huge material wealth through extensive economic growth model.At the same time,the increasingly serious environmental pollution problem has become more and more serious,which has endangered the normal life and production of the public,as well as the healthy and sustainable development of the economy.More importantly,with the continuous progress of industrialization,the environmental pollution is gradually changing from the traditional environmental pollution dominated by sulfur dioxide and particulate matter to the complex situation of new and complex environmental pollution with simultaneous and mutual influence of PM2.5,ozone,sulfur dioxide and other pollutants.In this situation,the Chinese Communist Party and the government have begun to pay attention to environmental protection issues very early,and have formulated and implemented a series of major environmental protection policies.But China's current environmental protection policies are mainly formulated by the central government and are implemented by local governments,so the implementation of the local government's environmental protection policy largely determines whether the environmental pollution problem can be effectively solved,and its environmental protection behavior directly affects the environmental governance effect of the entire country.However,due to the regional and transboundary characteristics of environmental pollution,a single local government cannot effectively solve environmental governance problems.Then how to carry out cooperative pollution control and improve the level of cooperation in pollution control among local governments are real problems that need to be solved urgently.It is related to the harmonious symbiosis between man and nature,and it is also related to the smooth progress of ecological civilization construction.For this reason,this paper attempts to take the cross-border environmental pollution control under the background of differential damage caused by multiple pollutants(noncumulative and cumulative pollutants)as the realistic starting point,take the externality theory,cross-border governance theory and other theories as the theoretical basis,and take the influencing factors of environmental governance strategies of industrial enterprises and local governments as the logical starting point to analyze.Then this paper uses the optimal control theory and method to study the problem of cross-border environmental pollution control under the background of multiple pollutants damage,and discusses the issues such as interaction mechanisms and influencing factors of governance strategies between industrial enterprises and local governments,as well as between local governments.Finally,this paper also uses numerical analysis to verify the rationality and effectiveness of the mathematical model.Specifically,the main research contents and conclusions of this paper are summarized as follows:(1)Based on the background that multiple pollutants cause different damage to the environment,this paper uses the optimal control theory to build a game model about cross-border pollution control between two neighboring regions,analyzes the optimal environmental governance strategies under non-cooperative and cooperative pollution control,such as the optimal pollutant emissions,the optimal environmental pollution control investment.At the same time,this paper investigates the impact of non cumulative and cumulative pollutants damage on the equilibrium results and the influence of initial pollution stock on the dynamic change of pollution stock.In addition,the optimal solutions of two environmental pollution control modes are compared and analyzed.The results are as follows: The optimal pollutant emissions of each region under cooperative pollution control is lower than that under non-cooperative pollution control;The optimal environmental pollution control investment of each region under the cooperative pollution control is higher than that under the non-cooperative pollution control;Whether it is non-cooperative or cooperative pollution control,the optimal environmental pollution control investment in each region has nothing to do with the damage degree of non-cumulative pollutants,and has a positive correlation with the damage degree of pollution stock;The total income of all regions under cooperative pollution control is higher than that under non-cooperative pollution control;The optimal trajectory of pollution stock is greatly influenced by the initial pollution stock,whether it is noncooperative or cooperative pollution control.(2)Based on the perspective of the differential damage caused by multiple pollutants to the environment and the mechanism of ecological compensation,the game model about the optimal control of cross-border pollution between two adjacent regions,which is composed of the compensated region and the compensated region,is constructed by using the optimal control theory.The optimal environmental governance strategies of each region under Stackelberg non-cooperative and cooperative governance are analyzed,including the optimal pollutant emissions,the optimal pollution control investment and the optimal ecological compensation coefficient.Besides,this paper discusses the impact of non-cumulative and cumulative pollutants damage on the equilibrium results,investigates the changes of the optimal path of pollution stock and environmental pollution governance investment stock caused by initial stock and other factors,and compares and analyzes the optimal solutions under the two control modes.The results are following: The optimal pollutant emissions of each region under cooperative governance is lower than that under Stackelberg non-cooperative governance;The optimal pollution control investment of each region under cooperative governance is higher than that under Stackelberg non-cooperative governance;Whether it is Stackelberg non-cooperation or cooperative governance,the optimal pollution governance investment in each region has nothing to do with the damage degree of non-cumulative and cumulative pollutants,has a positive correlation with the income coefficient of environmental governance,and has a negative correlation with the investment cost coefficient of pollution governance;The optimal ecological compensation coefficient under Stackelberg non-cooperative governance only depends on the benefits of environmental governance in the two regions,but has nothing to do with other factors;The difference of total income(cooperative surplus)between regions under Stackelberg non-cooperative and cooperative governance is related to the damage degree of non-cumulative pollutants to adjacent regions,the proportion of cumulative pollutants to instantaneous pollutant emissions and the damage degree of pollution stock,but not to the damage degree of non-cumulative pollutants to the local region;Whether it is Stackelberg non-cooperative or cooperative governance,the optimal paths of pollution stock and pollution governance investment stock are affected by governance mode,initial stock and other factors,and present a diversified trend.(3)Based on the background that multiple pollutants cause different damage to the environment,local governments and industrial enterprises are included in the same analysis framework.Firstly,the Stackelberg game model is used to analyze the dynamic decision-making process of local governments as leaders and industrial enterprises as followers to determine the optimal pollutant emissions of industrial enterprises.Subsequently,this paper constructs the game model of optimal control of transboundary pollution between two neighboring regions under the non-cooperative and cooperative governance,and uses the optimal control theory and simulation to analyze the optimal environmental governance strategies of each region,including the optimal environmental protection tax,the optimal pollution governance investment,etc.At the same time,this paper studies the impact of non-cumulative and cumulative pollutants damage on the equilibrium results and the impact of initial pollution stock on the dynamic change of pollution stock.Finally,this paper compares and analyzes the optimal solutions under the two governance modes.The results of this study are as follows: The optimal environmental protection tax in each region under cooperative governance is higher than that under non-cooperative governance;The optimal pollution control investment in each region under cooperative governance is higher than that under non-cooperative governance;The total income of all regions under cooperative governance is higher than that under non-cooperative governance;Whether it is non-cooperative governance or cooperative governance among regions,the optimal environmental protection tax in each region is positively correlated with the pollutant reduction ratio of industrial enterprises,but the correlation between the optimal pollutant emissions of industrial enterprises and the proportion of pollutant emissions reduction is uncertain,which is affected by the proportion of pollutant emissions reduction. |
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