Game Analysis On Formation Mechanism Of Fraud In Auction Market

As an important application category of transaction mechanism theory and game theory,auction theory has a history of nearly 60 years.Since Vickery won the Nobel Prize in 1996 as the founder of auction theory,the auction mechanism has been more widely accepted and highly recognized and applied by the society.Many auction mechanisms such as corporate(government)procurement,asset disposal and distribution,carbon emissions trading have been adopted by most countries in the world.Auction mechanism plays a more and more important role in economic development due to the effectiveness of contract allocation and the characteristics of market competitiveness.Millions of auctions are held worldwide every year.However,there are still some problems in the auction process,such as principal-agent,opaque information and so on,which make auction fraud occur from time to time.Although the origin of auction theory can be traced back to the ancient kingdom of Babylon,it has been less than 60 years since the auction was analyzed and studied through systematic mathematical tools.The expanded research on auction theory is very young.It can be seen that auction fraud has become a social focus in the auction field,but the research on the expansion of auction theory in this area has not kept pace with it.There are two main reasons: 1.The expansion of auction theory needs to relax the basic assumptions of classical auction,and the research in this area has only gradually appeared in the past 20 years,so the theoretical foundation has only just begun to be established;2.As a special economic problem,auction fraud often occurs together with bribery,so the characteristics of violation of laws and regulations are very prominent.However,it is obvious that there will be no official data details for this convenient problem,and it is difficult to analyze it by means of questionnaires,etc.,which has set up obstacles for the research work.China's research on auction fraud has also gone through a process from initial qualitative analysis(mainly for rent-seeking phenomenon)to quantitative research.At present,special cases of fraud such as limited corruption and collusion have begun to be discussed.However,there is no systematic research on the auction irregularities as auction fraud.According to the different implementers of auction fraud,this paper divides the fraud into three aspects: seller fraud,buyer fraud and middleman collusion.These three types of frauds basically include the types of participants in the general auction.Brokers are mostly auction houses and auction platforms.Because commissions are basically fixed and do not directly involve trading,they can only use their own power to find the other party participating in the auction for rent-setting.Therefore,middlemen do not involve individual fraud and are classified as conspirators.In view of the above classification,this article has carried on the correlation analysis research.First of all,this paper studies the seller fraud,the seller usually occupies the dominant position in the auction,there are more changes to the rules of the game.Therefore,this paper assumes that fraudulent sellers may use false quotations,while honest sellers will not,and the fraud may occur in the second price auction: fraudulent sellers pretend to be bidders to submit the quotation next to the highest price so as to obtain additional income.Bidders do not know which type of seller is participating in the auction.The two sellers choose the auction form according to their respective utility: the first price sealed auction or the second price sealed auction.The bidder takes the seller's choice as a signal,updates the judgment on the seller's type,and then formulates a bidding strategy.This is a process of signal cross-influence between buyers and sellers.Considering the relevance of buyer's value in the auction process,this paper refers to the principle of relevance value in establishing the model.According to the analysis of the model,the buyer and seller strategies in different situations are obtained,and the relationship among the buyer's quotation,the buyer's judgment and the seller's profit is studied.In this paper,Bayesian formula is used to predict the strategy selection problem of both parties,which increases the practical value compared with the simple probability distribution method.However,it is not difficult to find out from the analysis of buyer's fraud,because it occupies a passive position in the auction environment,so the fraud that can be carried out independently is very limited.However,it is the most common method for buyers to form alliance groups to collude in bidding.No matter which of the four classic auctions,as long as there are enough buyers involved in the conspiracy,the goal of reducing the transaction price can be achieved.This kind of phenomenon is especially prominent in the more specialized sub-sectors because the bidders are relatively fixed.Because middlemen do not directly participate in the auction process,but they also have a lot of information and power,so most of the auction fraud that middlemen participate in is collusion with bidders.Intermediaries obtain bribes by using their privileges to give some bidders bidding advantages.This can be summed up as collusion between middlemen and buyers! The collusion between the buyer and the buyer develops within the same level,which is called "horizontal collusion" in this paper.So the collusion between middlemen and buyers is called "vertical collusion" in this paper.It is also collusion between participants.What is the difference between the operating mechanism of horizontal collusion and vertical collusion? On the basis of the first price auction,this paper studies the vertical(auction host and buyer)and horizontal(buyer-to-buyer)forms of collusion by using the relevance value hypothesis.In the vertical conspiracy,the host negotiates with the buyer and generates additional income by making the winning bidder reduce the price to clinch a deal or making the losing bidder raise the price to win the bid.In the horizontal collusion,the buyers reached an agreement to jointly lower the price,making the transaction price very low.Under such a model background,this paper designs incentive compatibility mechanisms under two kinds of collusion,and compares the efficiency and conditions of collusion between the two kinds of collusion.Social supervision certainly has a restraining effect on auction fraud,so how should we grasp the strength of social supervision and what is its impact on fraud? Based on the reverse auction model with procurement corruption,this paper adds social supervision factors and analyzes the impact of social supervision on auction fraud.At the same time,this paper considers that social supervision also requires costs,not that the stronger the effort,the better.Therefore,through analysis,the conditions for the best supervision are obtained.In order to enrich the research work,this paper has added an expanded research on fraud based on auction theory.The so-called "turnip recruitment" refers to the act of deliberately setting one-sided terms or falsely declaring the qualifications of applicants in the recruitment process of hot positions in some units,thus allowing related applicants to get jobs smoothly.Recruitment can be seen as a reverse auction process in a broad sense.The recruitment process of the recruitment unit is similar to the bidding.The bidding target is the future employee's work,the price is the unit's paid salary,and the candidate is the bidder of this auction.Based on this,this paper establishes an auction model to simulate "radish recruitment",which also belongs to the category of vertical fraud by middlemen and bidders.The first price auction and the full payment auction are used to simulate different fraud scenarios.Through analysis,it is concluded that this kind of recruitment fraud has seriously affected the quality of recruitment,resulting in a deepening of social stratification.The elaboration of the corruption process in the model reveals the damage of corruption to social justice and suggests that the scope of supervision should pay attention to the abnormal capital flow within the boundary of corruption quotation.With the continuous improvement of the market economy,auction is bound to play a more and more important role,so how to supervise and prevent auction fraud is bound to receive more attention and research!...