Strategic and political implications of strategic defense systems' development

The international system is in a process of transition. It is probable that the future international system will be a balance of power one. A mathematical model based on the concept of entropy suggests that the emerging system might be less stable than the former one. It is also expected that an increased number of countries will have nuclear capabilities and adequate means of delivery. Therefore a reasonable level of military power must be maintained in order to protect our national interests.;The significant changes taking place in the world require a reexamination of the role of the vulnerability based deterrence in preventing a nuclear war. I do this reexamination by developing a set of functions (curves) for analyzing the utility of the first nuclear strike and the disutility of the corresponding counterstrike. I conclude that internal causes and structural systemic factors will relatively limit the role of vulnerability based deterrence in the emerging international system. Consequently, in order to compensate for an even limited failure of MAD, confidence building measures and/or disarmament agreements should be associated with the development and future deployment of strategic defensive systems. The SDI debate and some recent technological achievements suggest that the defense against ballistic missiles, conceived in rational and realistic terms, might be an attainable objective.;The necessity of strategic defense is supported by two sets of dynamical models. The first shows that a strategic offensive weapons arms race is unstable and indicates how the arms race's spiral occurs. It allows one to conclude that the development and future deployment of strategic defensive systems might be a means to control and to scale down the strategic offensive arms race. The second set includes three optimal control models. They may be used for studying the relationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive systems, and for deriving potentially optimal policies. These policies refer to the modernization and (probable) reduction of strategic offensive forces, and to the development and (probable) future deployment of strategic defensive systems. The computer programs which I wrote for the models allow one to efficiently simulate various possible scenarios.