An essay in law and economics and two essays in the economics of law-related labor

The main problem addressed by the first essay is that of delineating the economic and statistical underpining, as well as demonstrating the practical dimensions of the "Posner Rule" (i.e., the mathematical preliminary injunction rule announced and used by Judge Richard Posner). The materials and methods used include federal appellate case law and conceptual, historical and occasional mathematical analysis. The main conclusion is that the Posner Rule is optimal because it minimizes or avoids the social loss which might result from an erroneously granted injunction. A practical dimension of the Rule is that it can be used to classify actual preliminary injunctions by judges.; The problems addressed by the second essay are those of organizing and conceptualizing the enterprise which involves the economic analysis of the labor choices of legal practitioners, as well as modelling the decisions lawyers make in their efforts to secure federal judicial appointments. The methods used include conceptual and advanced mathematical economic analysis. In particular, a modified form of Jovanovic's "match" job search model is developed.; One conclusion is that it is useful to define the "economics of law-related labor" as the economic analysis of the supply, demand and labor choices of legal practitioners. This essay and the next therefore, address the nexus between the market for lawyers and the "market for judges." Second, in attempting to enter the market for judges, lawyers are motivated by the prospect of earning economic rent denominated in prestige units. The strategies used by lawyers either emphasize or deemphasize the ideological "match" between themselves and their pre-judicial employers.; Two problems are addressed by the third essay. The first is that of economically characterizing the Government's behavior in its selection of judges. The second is that of characterizing the behavior of lawyers at or around the time of judicial selection. The method is conceptual and comparative statics is the primary mathematical methodology. It is concluded that Government maximizes a Social Welfare Function which has the total amount of judicial services in the economy as one of its arguments (among others). The Government screens lawyers based on their ability to be low agency cost inputs in the production of judicial services. The labor-leisure choices of judicial candidates can be demonstrated by using a "entry cost of labor" apparatus.