Granting access: A rationalist explanation of INGO access to multilateral negotiations

This dissertation explores the conditions under which states grant International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) access to multilateral negotiations. In particular I explore the following key questions: First, under what conditions are INGOs granted access to multilateral negotiations? Second, which groups prevail in the competition for access? Third, what explains the type and degree of access granted? And finally, what explains INGO strategic choice and probability of access? I argue that all else being equal, states are also more likely to grant INGOs access to multilateral negotiations when they need information about how to regulate a transnational issue and INGOs can provide credible information at lower costs than competing information providers. I argue that the type and degree of access granted to INGOs is largely dependent on the nature of the bargaining problem at hand. States are more likely to grant INGOs formal access to a large number of states when the issue resembles a pure coordination problem. Conversely, states are likely to grant informal access to a smaller number of states when the issue resembles a battle-of-the-sexes problem. Finally, those groups chosen in the competition for access will those with a good reputation and who eschew protest as a lobbying tactic. To test this argument I examine five cases: the Ottawa Treaty; the MAI Affair; ISO 14001; the Montreal Protocol; and the Doha Round.