| The dissertation examines the Defense Science Board as a case study of the influence science advisors have had in American defense decision-making. The Board is expected to foster technical accuracy, efficiency, and military effectiveness, as well as compensate for potential biases, organizational rigidity, and misperceptions of key defense decision-makers. These expectations were predicated on the scientific norms of objectivity and independence which serve as the Board's founding myths.;The dissertation takes an institutional perspective which considers the Board a part of the science advisory function distributed throughout government. The perspective is also structural since the Board's influence depends on the resources available to and applied by the Board and the other participants in the decision-making process.;The dissertation notes that the Board's development and roles in decision-making are consequences of the tension between the "utopian" rationality of science, which eschews involvement in politics, and its opposite, "pragmatic" rationality, which argues political involvement is essential for scientific advice to become policy. This tension is manifested in the Board's norms which guide its structural development, member and leader selection, research agenda, study procedures, sponsor relationships, and the Board's roles in the defense decision making process. The dissertation argues that the Board's members desire to maximize their influence on defense policy. However, the Board's actual influence is a variable product of its institutional position, relationship with its sponsor, the substance of its advice, and politicization of the defense decision-making environment.;The dissertation concludes that the norms of objectivity and independence remain important guideposts, but internal social forces and external political pressures produce definitions of objectivity and independence unique to the Board. Furthermore, the increased politicization of defense decision-making also provides more opportunities for the Board to develop autonomy and maximize its influence over policy through various pragmatic strategies. However, the Board must preserve its authority by appearing faithful to the norms of objectivity and independence. Ultimately, three component case studies of the Board's influence on defense policy demonstrate that politicization has fundamentally changed the role science advisers play in the defense decision-making process. This transformation has significant implications for the future of the American defense policy and the role of science in democratic government. |
