| On May 12, 1975 the S.S. Mayaguez, an American merchant marine vessel, was seized by a Cambodian gunboat while in transit off the coast of Cambodia. The United States responded to this event with military force. This dissertation corrects all previous explanations of US behavior in the Mayaguez Crisis, ranging from the partisan criticism that President Ford took the opportunity to use force in order to enhance his domestic political standing, to the notion that the US response was simply the result of national frustration in the wake of the ignominious US withdrawal from Indochina.;Using previously classified material, it is shown that US decision makers held three conflicting objectives, but ultimately gave priority to the perceived need to signal to North Korea that the United States would resist any act of aggression on the Korean peninsula. While explaining the motives of US decision makers, the critical importance of individual belief systems in the decision making process is highlighted. Ford's influential subordinates acted on their beliefs (though not always in cooperation) and controlled the informal decision making process, which had a more critical impact on the outcome of the crisis than formal National Security Council deliberations. The relative explanatory efficacy of the state centric and bureaucratic explanations of decision making are also examined. |
