EXCLUSIVE DEALING CONTRACTS AND THEIR RELATION TO TYING CONTRACTS: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS. (VOLUMES I AND II) |
Posted on:1989-09-11 | Degree:Ph.D | Type:Dissertation |
University:Cornell University | Candidate:FRASCO, GREGG PETER | Full Text:PDF |
GTID:1476390017454829 | Subject:Economics |
Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request |
A supply contract can be thought of as an agreement which defines the terms under which a good is transferred from a seller (lessor) to a buyer (lessee). Since much and perhaps most of economic activity does not take place in instantaneous auction markets, it follows that supply contracts play a very fundamental role in the economy. Hence the study of supply contracts is an important task for economists. This dissertation focuses on one particular type of supply contract, namely, the exclusive dealing contract. Limited discussions of supply contracts on a broader level are also present.; Chapter one reviews the literature on exclusive dealing contracts. This review reveals that the topic of anticompetitive effects from exclusive dealing contracts has received very little rigorous analysis. Chapter two provides a theoretical model which demonstrates that exclusive dealing contracts can indeed have anticompetitive effects. Hence the results of chapter two support the contention that there is need for a considerable amount of economic research in the area of supply contracts.; Chapter three attempts to extend the model of chapter two by removing one of the assumptions underlying that model.; Another special type of supply contract is the tying contract. This type of contract is related to the exclusive dealing contract in a policy-relevant manner. Indeed, even the distinction between the two types of contracts on a purely definitional level is a matter of some debate. Chapter four reviews the literature on the tying contract.; Chapter five (i) provides a methodology for systematically organizing from a supply contract perspective a large number of factual situations, and (ii) employs this methodology to all the antitrust cases which have reached the (federal) Courts of Appeals level or higher. Chapter six (i) provides some generalizations with respect to the findings of chapter five, and (ii) delineates in a precise fashion some areas in which further research is needed. |
Keywords/Search Tags: | Contract, Chapter, Economic, Tying |
PDF Full Text Request |
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