Removing the obstructions: Minority rights and the politics of procedural change in the nineteenth century House of Representatives

Under what conditions can a minority expect its rights to be limited by a majority? This dissertation studies that problem within the context of a particular institution (the U.S. House of Representatives), a particular time (the partisan era, 1837-1895), and a particular set of minority rights (the right to obstruct legislation). Chapter I sets the stage and shows how many theories of institutional change are unable to account for the timing of the major rules changes of the House during the partisan era.;Chapter II presents a formal theory which predicts that steps to limit obstruction should be taken when the majority party is small, and hence cohesive. When the majority is cohesive, amendments from the minority party to majority proposals will fail. Hence the only effective strategy for minority members is to obstruct legislation. Anticipating (or experiencing) this obstruction, the majority party will have an incentive to limit the procedural guarantees which allow minorities to obstruct. This theory also predicts that cross-cutting cleavages will increase the incentive for members to maintain obstructionist procedures. This chapter also provides some initial tests of the theory. Roll-call analysis reveals an inverse relationship between party size and cohesion. The major rules changes of the partisan era did occur when the majority party was small.;Chapters III and IV undertake case studies of the major rules changes. In each case, steps were taken to limit obstruction, and positions in debate and on votes tended to divide on party lines. Weaker attempts to limit obstruction could be explained by sectional pressures cross-cutting party lines, consistent with the theory. Chapter V summarizes the results, analyzes potential criticisms, and suggests future research topics. In particular, I show that many of the Congresses which had small majorities but which have not been identified by legislative scholars as experiencing major rules changes did take steps to limit obstruction. Promising evidence is also presented that the same processes outlined for the partisan-era House were also at work in the Senate during the end of the nineteenth century.